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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts-Distinction Between Offer and Preliminary
Negotiation
For a proposal to be turned into a binding contract by an acceptance,
it must, as a general rule, be made in contemplation of legal conse-
quences. When made with these intentions, it is a good offer; other-
wise it becomes what is commonly called a preliminary negotiation.
The difficulty of drawing an exact line between these two is recognized
by the authorities everywhere.' In deciding if legal consequences were
contemplated, the courts seek to determine whether the party making
the proposal intended to create a contract upon acceptance of the pro-
posal or intended merely to negotiate for one.2  Fact situations, from
which offer-preliminary negotiations difficulties may arise, include those
based on (1) invitations to deal, (2) advertising circulars, (3) esti-
mates, (4) oral agreement on terms to be reduced to writing, and (5)
agreements with one or more terms left open. In a recent federal case,3
the court was confronted with this type of problem.
There, the plaintiff expressed an interest in purchasing coal from
the defendant for the 1947-48 burning season. The defendant quoted
his coal prices, but refused to sign his name on a memorandum on which
plaintiff had written these prices, until the word "quotation" was written
across the top. Defendant increased price on second shipment. On
plaintiff's refusal to pay the increase the defendant stopped shipments
and this suit for breach of contract ensued. In holding the defendant's
quotations were not an offer, but rather an invitation to make an offer,
the court took note of several factors. Among these was the fact that
plaintiff had knowledge of the custom and practice of the industry as
to contracts of this nature4 and the pendency of the wage agreement and
"Frequently negotiations for a contract are begun between parties by general
expression of willingness to enter into a bargain upon stated terms and yet the
natural construction of the words and conduct of the parties is rather that they
are inviting offers or suggesting the terms of a possible future bargain, than mak-
ing positive offers. . ... Language that at first sight may seem an offer may
be found merely preliminary in its character." 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §27 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
2El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 IIl. 494, 127 N. W. 642
(1920) ; Inr re Kaufmann's Estate, 137 Pa. Super. 88, 8 A. 2d 472 (1939); Wind-
sor Mfg. Co. v. Makransky & Sons, 322 Pa. 466, 186 Atl. 84 (1936).
Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
' The court found ". . . that the general custom in the anthracite industry was
not to enter into contracts for the sale of coal, wholesale, over any long period
of time .... When price quotations are made it is not considered in the industry
as an offer or sale, but as an invitation to the trade to submit orders-offers to
buy-which may or may not be accepted." Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231,
233 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
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consequent price increase.5
As a general rule, a price quotation, whether in the form of an
advertising circular or an invitation to deal, is not an offer. The famous
case of Nebraska Seed Company v. Harsh6 dearly sustains this point.
However, under some circumstances it may be an offer, particularly is
this true where, in answer to a definite request for an offer, a price
quotation is sent that accurately describes the property and states definite
contractual terms.7  North Carolina agrees with the above rules,8 with
the possible exception of one case,9 which is explainable on its facts.
In that case, the defendant sent the following telegram: "Can offer you
extra force at $65 per month. Will want you at once to ditch D. & N.
road and R. & G. Answer quick. Job will last all the year." Plaintiff
was discharged eleven days after starting to work. When sued for
breach of contract, the defendant contended that the telegram did not
constitute an offer, but was a preliminary negotiation and that if a con-
tract existed it should be construed subject to the rules of the company.10
The jury found for the plaintiff and on appeal, while affirming, the
court explained the terminology of the telegram by saying--"The argu-
ment .. .that by using the potential 'can offer,' Elmore (defendant's
agent) did not make a positive offer of employment, but only intended
to open negotiations, is entirely destroyed by the undisputed evidence
that the plaintiff accepted the offer by wire, reported for duty and
was placed in charge of the work and prosecuted it for eleven days until
discharged." While the result in this case is sound, the court's inter-
pretation of the telegram seems wrong. It would appear that the tele-
gram from the defendant's agent was not an offer. The telegram merely
informed plaintiff that a certain job for a definite length of time and at
I "For sometime prior and subsequent to July 1, 1947, the anthracite coal
operators and miners were negotiating a wage contract. It was generally known
in the industry that the adjustment would be upward and the wage increase would
be immediately absorbed and reflected in the price per ton of anthracite coal."
Cohen v. Johnson, 91 F. Supp. 231, 233 (M. D. Pa. 1950).
698 Neb. 89, 152 N. W. 310 (1915) (quotation of seed price not an offer).
7 Maedler Steel Products Co. v. Zanello, 109 Ore. 562, 220 Pac. 155 (1923);
1 WLiisrox, CoNR aAcs §27 (Rev. ed. 1936).
8 Clark Manufacturing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 152 N. C. 157,
67 S. E. 329 (1910) ("Will you accept receivership... ?" Held: inquiry as to
whether he would take job or not); Cherokee Tanning Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 143 N. C. 376, 55 S. E. 777 (1906) (A to B: "Kindly advise .
by wire ... if you can use about 1500 creosote barrels . . . at 95 cents each. .. ."
Held: no contract as there was no offer, stating an . . . offer must be distinct
as such and not merely an invitation to enter into negotiations upon certain
basis . . .); Walser v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 114 N. C. 440, 19 S. E.
366 (1894) ("Will you accept eight one-half all two-fifty drills if we can get
offer... ?" Held: trade inquiry).9 King v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 140 N. C. 433, 53 S. E. 37 (1906).
10 The company offered proof that it was their policy not to hire any person
for a long period of time, but rather to hire on a month-to-month basis. Plaintiff
knew of this policy, but contended and the jury agreed, that this was a special
contract not subject to the general rules.
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a stated pay was open with the defendant, but on the surface seemed
to lack that expression of willingness on defendant's part necessary to
make an offer. Plaintiff by appearing for work made the offer, and
defendant by putting him to work, accepted the offer creating a contract
containing the terms set forth in the telegram, they being the only
ones mentioned. By its holding in this case the court sustained its
previous rulings that it is the manifested intent that controls, rather
than the language used.
Similarly, when a party receives an estimate, he, by the majority
rule, cannot by "accepting" the estimate make a binding contract. The
word "estimate" is usually construed to mean "more or less"'" and
unless the party makes his estimate in the form of a bid for the work,
he has not made an offer which can be accepted. No North Carolina
authority on this point has been discovered. However it would seem
that our court, in view of its position when confronted with analogous
situations," would follow the majority view.
The problem of distinguishing between an offer and a preliminary
negotiation presents itself in a somewhat different manner when the
person making the proposal suggests, before a binding transaction is
entered into, that the parol agreement be reduced to writing later. The
courts are then called upon to determine if this suggestion makes an
otherwise good offer a contract upon acceptance, or makes the complete
transaction a preliminary negotiation. When faced with this question,
most courts have held that where the material terms' 3 of the proposal
have been definitely understood and accepted, the subsequent failure to
embody such terms in a written contract does not prevent the agree-
ment from being binding on the parties.1 4  This is particularly true
where a draft is viewed by the parties as merely a convenient memorial
or record of their previous contract. However, if a draft be viewed as
the final act of their negotiations, there is no contract until its execution.
The courts in endeavoring to find which attitude is present in any par-
ticular case, should consider numerous factors among which are (1)
whether the contract is of that class which is usually found in writing,
(2) whether it is of such nature as to need a formal writing for its
full expression, (3) whether it has few or many details, (4) whether
the amount is large or small, (5) whether it is a common or unusual
contract and (6) whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a
written draft is contemplated as the final conclusion of the negotiations.
11Robbins v. Hill, 259 S. W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
12 See note 8 supra.
11 It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss what terms are or are not
material to constitute a good offer.
" Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v. Chesapeake Terra Cotta Co., 96 Conn. 88, 113
Atl. 156 (1921); Priest v. Oehler, 328 Mo. 590, 41 S. W. 2d 783 (1931).
1950]
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The North Carolina court has taken these factors into consideration
in several cases.15
On the other hand, if a party in the course of his negotiations has
omitted or has failed to get an agreement on all the material terms of
his proposal, then a contractual relationship cannot come into being.10
As a general rule, where some material term is left open to be decided
upon later, there is no contract.17 Yet, the existence of an election,
to be exercised within prescribed limits by one of the parties, in regard
to a term of the offer does not vitiate it for uncertainty.' 8 The North
Carolina court in agreeing with this rule in Elks v. North State Insur-
ance Co.19 said, "The offer must not merely be complete in terms, but
the terms must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine
ultimately whether the contract has been performed or not."
From these cases and those of other jurisdictions, it appears that
in order for the courts to distinguish between an offer and a preliminary
negotiation they must be able to answer these questions: first, has the
party making the proposal sufficiently named all the material terms
needed in the contract; second, has he put his proposal in a form show-
ing no mental hesitation or reservation on his part. In seeking to
answer these questions and thereby ultimately arrive at the true inten-
tions of the parties, it is fundamental that the court put itself, as nearly
as possible, in the same position the parties were in at the time of their
negotiations. To do this will require a complete and thorough under-
standing of (1) the subject matter of the contract, (2) the contem-
plated acts of the parties, (3) the relationship between the parties, (4)
the general custom and practice of the trade and (5) the circumstances
under which the parties were then acting.
ROLAND C. BRASWELL.
15 Wilkin v. Vass Cotton Mills, 176 N. C. 72, 97 S. E. 151 (1918) (contract to
buy cotton goods held good, the court finding that the negotiations of the parties
indicated they expected to be bound before reducing terms to writing); Billings
v. Wilby, 175 N. C. 571, 96 S. E. 50 (1918) (contract to put in sewer line held
good without being put in formal draft, this being the usual contract made for
this type work) ; Gooding v. Moore, 150 N. C. 195, 63 S. E. 895 (1909)
(negotiations showed that parties intended contract should arise immediately, the
court stating, "When the parties to an oral contract contemplate a subsequent
reduction of it to writing, as a matter of convenience and prudence and not
as a condition precedent, it is binding upon them, though the intent to formally
express the agreement in writing was never effectuated.") ; Teal v. Templeton,
149 N. C. 32, 62 S. E. 737 (1908) (oral rental contract held good without writing,
it being the accepted rule that a lease for three years or less need not be in
writing).
"United States v. P. J. Carlin Const Co., 224 Fed. 859 (2d Cir. 1915)
Rushing v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 224 Fed. 74 (10th Cir. 1915).
17 Boatright v. Steinite Radio Corp., 46 F. 2d 385 (10th Cir. 1931); A. 0.
Anderson and Co. v. Texas Co., 279 Fed. 76 (2d Cir. 1922).
" McNeely v. Carter, 23 N. C. 141 (1840) (contract to sell cotton under
which seller was to set the price by selection of a date and one of three towns,
the price at that place to be the selling price).
" 159 N. C. 619, 75 S. E. 808 (1912).
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Corporations-Stockholder's Action for Declaration of Dividends-
Failure to Join Directors
One of the problems facing a stockholder wishing to bring a suit for
the declaration of dividends has been to find a forum in which the suit
could be brought. In the past such a suit required that a majority of
the directors be made parties defendant.1 With the advent of huge
corporations this became an almost impossible task, since it was likely
that the board of directors would be made up of men from various
states. It has been suggested that suits prosecuted against the directors
in their various jurisdictions, holding all of the judgments in abeyance
until the final judgment was secured, would produce the desired re-
sults.2 The multiplicity of suits involved, however, makes this plan
undesirable.. The only alternative, waiting until all of the directors are
assembled within one jurisdiction, and then obtaining service of process
before they escape, is too uncertain to be practicable.
In Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp.,3 a solution was laid down
which is simple and shows the modem bench's ability to provide a
method whereby the ends of justice may be served. Action was brought
by the plaintiff, a minority stockholder and a resident of New York,
to compel the declaration and payment of accumulated dividends on
preferred stock. The federal court decided the case on Delaware law
as it would be interpreted by a Pennsylvania court. When the suit
was first instituted against the corporation, none of the directors were
named as parties defendant; but upon the ruling of the district court
that a majority of the board of directors were indispensable parties,
three of the twelve members were served. The plaintiff claimed that
there was no one state or federal jurisdiction in which a majority could
be served. The district court held that the action could go no further
without personal jurisdiction over a majority of the 'directors.5 It was
alleged, and for the purposes of this appeal taken to be true, that 92
per cent of the no-par common shares were held by four large users6
of the corporation's products. Also outstanding were 100,000 shares of
$6.00 cumulative preferred no-par stock. Dividend arrearages on the
cumulative preferred no-par stock amounted to $57.75 per share when
1 BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5326 (Perm. ed. 1932).
2Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); see 61 HARV. L.
REv. 1253 (1948).
8 179 F. 2d 760 (3rd Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1026 (1950); see
98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 753 (1950).
'The corporation, with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, was
incorporated under the laws of Delaware.
"Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 9 F. R. D. 273 (E. D. Pa. 1949).
'American Steel Foundries Corporation, 38.339o%; Baldwin Locomotive Works,
33.37%; American Locomotive Company, 13.149o; and Pullman Incorporated,
8.54%.
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the complaint was filed. The corporation was in excellent financial
condition.7  In holding that the directors were not indispensable parties
to the action, the court of appeals stated that a judgment against the
corporation compelling the payment of dividends could be enforced by
a judgment against the property of the corporation.
An action for the declaration of dividends is of an equitable nature.8
In general, the courts will not interfere with the discretion of the direc-
tors in declaring dividends,9 but there may be a contractual relationship
which will strictly limit this 'discretion.'0 A corporation, however, is
operated for the benefit of the stockholders; when there is an abuse of
this discretion (i.e., the directors act in bad faith, through fraudulent
motives, or for the benefit of others than the stockholders as a whole)
a court of equity will compel the directors to declare a dividend." In
the past the action has been thought of, erroneously it seems, as one in
personam against the directors for misconduct.12  The duty co-relative
to the stockholder's right rests on the corporation rather than on the
directors as individuals. A noted text writer, in pointing out that the
action is neither derivative nor for a wrong done to the corporation,
states that the right to be enforced is against the corporation. 8 The
wrong in failing to declare dividends is that of the corporation, acting
as it must, through its board of directors, which serves most nearly in
the capacity of principal, and consequently as the alter ego of the
corporation.1
4
Is the judgment for a stated sum in the form of "judgment divi-
dends" collectible from the corporation 'directly as in the case of a
creditor? The scant authority seems to be in disagreement. A nega-
7On December 31, 1947, the corporation had a net worth of $28,000,165; a
capital surplus of $4,133,449; an earned surplus of $13,410,080; net current assets
of $12,114,409; and a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of seven to one.
I BALLENTiNE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5326 (Perm. ed. 1932) ; 10 ROCKY MOUN-
TArN L. REV. 201 (1938).
' Crocker v. Waltham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N. E. 2d 230 (1944);
BALLENTINE, CORPORATIrOS §232 (Rev. ed. 1946); 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §5325 (Perm. ed. 1932).
" New England Trust Co. v. Penobscot Chemical Fiber Co., 50 A. 2d 188
(Me. 1946).
"2 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919).
" Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N. W. 668 (1919); NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938).
" BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §234 (Rev. ed. 1946) (in same section writer
also states that directors should be joined as parties defendant).
1, See BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS §42 (Rev. ed. 1946). The courts in analo-
gous situations have held the corporation liable for crimes and torts committed
through its agents. Crimes: Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263,
75 P. 924 (1904) ; State v. Salisbury Ice & Fuel Co., 166 N. C. 366, 81 S. E. 689
(1914); State v. The Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N. C. 610, 69 S. E. 58 (1910).
Torts: Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys School, 160 Mass. 177, 35 N. E. 776 (1893);
Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 220 N. C. 642, 18 S. E. 2d 166 (1942).
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tive answer can be inferred from those cases requiring that directors be
joined as parties defendant. 15 The Kroese case holds it collectible from
the corporation, 16 pointing out, analogously, that when a creditor re-
ceives a judgment, some action is required by the board of directors,
officers, or agents of the corporation if it is to comply with the judg-
ment. These acts, however, such as passing a resolution for the pay-
ment of the debt, entering payment on the corporate books, and the
physical tendering of payment, are purely ministerial. Such ministerial
acts do not render the judgment more valid. If the ministerial acts are
not performed, the judgment creditor can issue an execution, levy the
same upon and sell the property of the corporation to the same extent
as if it were a natural person.17 In like respect if the directors failed to
perform the proper ministerial acts necessary to declaring dividends, the
stockholder could, through equity, sequester the property of the corpora-
tion or have a receiver appointed to carry out the judgment of the
court.18 It is not clear from the instant case whether each stockholder
could obtain a judgment against the corporation for his share of divi-
dends in the event the directors failed to declare a dividend as a result
of the court's judgment. If the directors failed to declare a dividend,
the appointment of a receiver would eliminate a multiplicity of suits,
and thus best carry out the judgment of the court.
Indispensable parties are those whose interests are such that no de-
cree can be rendered which will not affect them, and therefore the court
cannot proceed until they are brought in.1 9 The directors are not indis-
pensable parties to an action for a declaration of dividends. They are
required to take no formal action whatsoever in compliance with the
judgment of the court. The judgment is sufficient to establish the rights
of the stockholder to dividends.
One other case, Schuckman v. Rubenstein,2° has been decided on this
same point.21 Only two of the nine members of the board of directors
15 See Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947); Gesell v.
Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) ; NY PA NJ Utilities
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938).1 8
"The duty of a corporation to pay dividends then and there has been im-
posed by the judgment of the court.... The situation becomes in substance the
same as that in which any corporate creditor sues the enterprise in the corporate
name to recover from it what it owes him...." Kroese v. General Steel Castings
Corp., 179 F. 2d 760, 764 (3rd Cir. 1950).
21 10 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §4741
(Perm. ed 1932).28 Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F. 2d 760 (3rd Cir. 1950).19 American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 57 F. Supp. 545 (N. D. Cal.
1944); MacBryde v. Burnett, 41 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1941); McRanie v.
Palmer, 2 F. R. D. 479 (D. Mass. 1942) ; MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES §209 (1929). See FED. R. CIv. P. 19 (b); 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2150 (2d ed. 1948).
'0 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947).
"' Three other cases, while not decided on this same point, raise this question.
O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N. E. 2d 656 (1940) (action to
1950]
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were properly before the court. The court held that at least a majority
of the board of directors were indispensable parties defendant. By dic-
tum, however, the court indicated that the plaintiff might have a good
cause of action against the corporation alone to recover dividends al-
ready declared without the joining of a majority of the board of direc-
tors. This indicates that once the discretion of the directors has been
exercised and dividends declared, the courts can then enter a judgment
against the corporation for the payment of the declared dividends. Their
reasoning is based on the rule that it is within the discretion of the
directors to declare dividends; and they must, therefore, be before the
court in order that a judgment can be entered compelling them to de-
clare dividends. This fails to consider one of the arguments in the
Kroese case that the court in declaring dividends in a proper case re-
places the discretionary action of the directors with the judgment of the
court.
In North Carolina, the situation is somewhat different from that of
the principal case because the statute regulating the declaration of divi-
dends 22 requires that a stockholder first apply to the directors for a
declaration of dividends, and if refused, an action of mandamus will lie.
It must be alleged that such an application was made and refused by the
directors before the court will grant relief under the statute.
28
It is interesting to note that the objections2 to ordering the declara-
tion of dividends without a majority of the -directors present as parties
defendant do not arise in North Carolina. The North Carolina court
has said in regard to the declaration of dividends that, "By virtue of the
statute there is no discretion in the board of directors with respect to
the performance of this duty.' '25 And yet, in Southern Mills, Inc. v.
Armnstrong,2 6 the court reached substantially the same result as those
recover dividends on stock held in one man corporation; held, failure to object in
time to lack of directors as parties constituted a waiver). Jones v. Van Heusen
Charles Co., 230 App. Div. 694, 24o N. Y. S. 204 (1930) (plaintiff brought stock-
holder's representative action to compel payment of dividends and for the mis-
management and misconduct of directors; held, the corporation, officers, and
directors must be named as defendants). Gesell v. Tomahawk Land Co., 184
Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) (demurrer to complaint was sustained because
it did not establish propriety of compelling dividend and on further ground that
directors were not made defendants).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-115 (1943).
"Winstead v. Hearne Bros. & Co., 173 N. C. 606, 92 S. E. 613 (1917).
2 Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U. S. 875 (1948) (court cannot declare dividend; therefore action is in personam
against members of the board) ; NY PA NJ Utilities Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 23 F. Supp. 313 (1938) (suit against directors for misconduct) ; Gesell v.
Tomahawk Land Co., 184 Wis. 537, 200 N. W. 550 (1924) (because declaration
of dividends is within good-faith discretion of directors, they are entitled to be
heard).
" Cannon v. Wiscassett Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 123, 141 S. E. 344, 346
(1928).
20223 N. C. 495, 27 S. E. 2d 281 (1943).
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cases prior to the principal case. In the Southern Mills case, the plain-
tiff company brought an action for mandamus, mandatory injunction or
other appropriate relief, naming the corporation and the three directors
as defendants. Service on the two non-resident directors was by publi-
cation which was held to be insufficient, and the action was dismissed.
It seems the court could have held that the directors were not
necessary parties to the action and that a mandatory injunction could
have been granted against the corporation for the declaration of the
dividends.2 7
The result of the principal case is commercially sound and conducive
of wholesome conduct of corporate affairs. It is unconscionable that
the majority stockholders of the voting stock could so choose their direc-
tors that a minority stockholder could not bring suit to enforce his rights
due to his inability to get personal service of a majority of the widely
scattered board of directors. By such a process, the majority stock-
holders could control the corporation through the directors almost with-
out restriction. This the courts should not allow.
2 8
EDWIN B. ROBBINS.
Criminal Law-Transportation of Alcoholic Beverages
The Turlington Act' of 1923 made it unlawful in North Carolina to
transport intoxicating liquor in any quantity for beverage purposes.
2
While this act has not been repealed, the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act3 of 1937 has modified some of its provisions 4 The basic trans-
27 Clark v. The Henrietta Mills, 219 N. C. 1, 3, 12 S. E. 2d 682, 683 (1941).
The action was, "to have corporate reorganization together with amendments to
the charter of defendant, declared invalid as to plaintiff; to protect plaintiff's rights
to accrued dividends on preferred stock claimed to be unlawfully invalid or de-
feated by the reorganization; to compel the payment of such dividends prior to
the payment of dividends on reorganization stock; and to restrain defendant from
the prior payment of dividends on any stock until dividends on plaintiff's preferred
stock are first paid." Injunction was granted to preserve and enforce plaintiff's
rights without requiring directors to be joined as defendants, although the ques-
tion was not raised by the corporation.
" Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F. 2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316
U. S. 675 (1942).
'The Turlington Act is now N. C. GEx. STAT. §§18-1-18-30 (1943). It was
intended to make the North Carolina prohibition law conform substantially with
the National Prohibition Act, and in some respects it is more stringent. See
State v. Hickey, 198 N. C. 45, 150 S. E. 615 (1929).
2 N. C. GEr. STAT. §18-2 (1943). "No person shall manufacture, sell, barter,
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, purchase, or possess any intoxicating
liquor except as authorized in this article... "'
'N. C. GawN. STAT. §§18-36-18-62 (1943). The A.B.C. Act was intended to
establish a uniform system of administration and control of the sale of certain
alcoholic beverages in North Carolina. It provides that in counties where an
election has been held and a majority of those voting in the election have ex-
pressed themselves in favor of the operation of liquor stores, county A.B.C. stores
may be established and operated under the supervision of the county A.B.C. Board.
For a thorough discussion of the Act see State v. Davis, 214 N. C. 787, 1 S. E.
2d 104 (1939).
'See State v. Barnhardt, 230 N. C. 223, 52 S. E. 2d 904 (1949); State v.
Wilson, 227 N. C. 43, 40 S. E. 2d 449 (1946).
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portation provision of the 1937 Act permits transportation of not more
than one gallon of tax-paid liquor from a "wet" county into or through
a "dry" county, provided it is not transported for the purpose of sale
and the seal or cap of the container has not been broken or opened.5
The language of the statute made it uncertain whether the limit of
one gallon applied to the sum total which could be conveyed in a vehicle
or to the amount of liquor which each person in such a vehicle might
convey." This question was before the North Carolina Supreme Court
in State v. Welch.7  Defendant and his wife were riding together in
defendant's automobile en route from Charlotte to Monroe, North Caro-
lina, with two packages, each containing one gallon of liquor purchased
in Charlotte at a county Alcoholic Beverage Control store. While
traveling through "dry" Union County they were stopped by two
patrolmen who wished to examine defendant's driver's license. One of
the patrolmen discovered the two gallons of liquor and arrested defend-
ant for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor. Although defendant
declared that one package of whisky belonged to his wife and that he
had no knowledge that the package contained liquor until it was opened
by the patrolman, the jury found him guilty of intentionally transporting
intoxicating liquor in excess of one gallon.
The case put directly in issue the meaning of the controversial
statutory provision, "It shall not be unlawful for any person to trans-
port a quantity of alcoholic beverages not in excess of one gallon.... ."
Unanimously affirming the lower court's action, the Supreme Court held
that the driver or other person in control of an automobile who know-
ingly conveys liquor in excess of one gallon, even though it belongs to
and is in possession of a passenger, transports such liquor and thereby
becomes guilty of illegal transportation. In reaching this conclusion the
"It shall not be unlawful for any person to transport a quantity of alcoholicbeverages not in excess of one gallon from a county in North Carolina coming
under the provisions of this article to or through another county in North Caro-lina not coming under the provisions of this article .... " N. C. GEN. STAT. §18-49(1943). See State v. Davis, 214 N. C. 787, 1 S. E. 2d 104 (1939).
* Prior to the decision in the instant case the meaning of the statute had beenin doubt, some superior court judges adhering to a ruling by the attorney general
that the limit was one gallon per car, and others holding that each passenger
might own and possess one gallon of liquor without making the driver guilty ofillegal transportation. The latter view apparently has been adopted by Virginia,
whose transportation laws likewise forbid transportation by any person in excess
of one gallon. VA. CoD tit. 4, §72 (1950). No test case seems to have
arisen in a court of record in Virginia, but Section 46 of the Virginia AlcoholicBeverage Control Board Regulations provides that intoxicating liquor ". . . may
be transported in amounts in excess of one gallon in a vehicle occupied by more
than one person, provided that such alcoholic beverages shall have been lawfully
acquired and are in the possession of the bona fide owner thereof, and that noperson in such vehicle shall have more than one gallon of such alcoholic beverages
without a permit from the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board."7232 N. C. 77, 59 S. E. 2d 199 (1950).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §18-49 (1943).
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court reasoned that since "transport" means to carry about or from one
place to another,9 a person transports liquor not only when he conveys
it on his person, but also when he conveys it in a vehicle under his con-
trol.10 Questions of ownership or possession have no bearing on the
transportation issue.1 This argument is based on firm precedent and
appears to be legalistically sound.
The decision is of great practical importance if only for the reason
that it tends to clarify the confused situation which had existed in con-
nection with the North Carolina transportation law.12  The extent to
which the court's ruling will tend to break up the illegal liquor traffic is
a matter of conjecture.'" The decision is also worthy of attention since
our court declared that, although not required by the express terms of
the statute, knowledge of the nature of the goods transported is neces-
sary for conviction.
The court amplified its view with respect to the guilty knowledge
aspect in the very recent decision of State v. Elliott.14  Defendants,
charged with transportation of nontax-paid liquor, pleaded lack of
knowledge of the presence of the liquor in their car and offered evidence
in support of the plea.15 Under an instruction that the jury should
return a verdict of guilty if they were satisfied that defendants had
transported the liquor, defendants were found guilty. In line with its
conclusion in State v. Welch, the Supreme Court remanded on the
'Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100 (1923).
10 Fitts v. State, 24 Ala. App. 405, 135 So. 654 (1931); Berry v. State, 196
Ind. 258, 148 N. E. 143 (1925) ; Currie v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. App. 653, 279
S. W. 834 (1925). See West v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. App. 370, 371, 248 S. W.
371 (1923).1 Green v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 698, 243 S. W. 917 (1922) (owner of
car permitting whisky therein guilty of transportation, though he did not own
whisky or know where it came from) ; People v. Ninehouse, 227 Mich. 480, 198
N. W. 973 (1924) (taxidriver accepting drink from passenger's bottle held guilty
of transportation); Cassius v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. App. 456, 7 S. W. 2d 530
(1928) (owner operating vehicle, knowing it contained liquor, guilty of trans-
portation though he had no pecuniary interest in liquor) ; Szymanski v. State, 93
Tex. Grim. App. 631, 248 S. W. 380 (1923) (owner operating vehicle, knowing
passenger had liquor, guilty of transportation).
12 This decision clearly limits to one gallon per car the amount which may
be transported into or through a "dry" county, but it is not settled whether this
ruling applies to transportation into or through a "wet" county.
1" Interviews with various A.B.C. enforcement officers reveal a wide divergence
in opinion as to the effect of the decision on illegal transportation. Most thought
the effect would be negligible, in view of the habitual disregard manifested toward
the law by liquor peddlers. Nevertheless it seems definite that, given proper law
enforcement, the decision at least prevents the bootlegger from raising his trans-
portation "quota" by the simple device of carrying a passenger to claim owner-
ship of each gallon.14 232 N. C. 377, 61 S. E. 2d 93 (1950).
15 Defendants were in the front seat of the car belonging to one of the defend-
ants, one Riddick being in the back seat, when the sheriff approached and found
four gallons of nontax-paid liquor in a bag in the back seat. Defendants testified
that they had stopped and picked up Riddick, who was walking along the road
with a box under his arm and a bag on his back, and that they knew nothing about
the contents of the bag until the sheriff discovered it.
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ground that, if the issue of lack of knowledge is raised by the pleadings
or evidence, it is error for the court to fail to instruct the jury that
defendants would not be guilty unless they had knowledge of the pres-
ence of the liquor in the automobile. It should be noted, however, that
the court qualified the statements it had made in State v. Welch on the
guilty knowledge issue by declaring that the state made out a prima
facie case of guilty knowledge when it proved that there was more than
one gallon of liquor in an automobile in the possession of and operated
by the defendant. Thus, if the defendant wishes to avail himself of
lack of guilty knowledge as a defense, he incurs the burden of procuring
and offering evidence to establish that fact.16
TENCH C. COXE, III.
Deeds-Conveyance to the Heirs of a Living Person
By the common law, if an owner of land in fee simple attempted to
convey a life estate or an estate in tail, with a remainder to the grantor's
heirs, the remainder was void and a reversion was created by operation
of law.' If, however, the grantor sufficiently indicated that "heirs"
meant a class of remaindermen different from his heirs general, the rule
had no application. 2 The application of this rule meant that the grantor
might subsequently defeat his heirs by conveying the property in ques-
tion to other persons. The reasons given for the rule were: (1) the
maxim that there can be no heirs of a living person,3 and (2) the
reluctance to deprive the grantor's overlord of certain feudal rights
which attached only if the property passed by descent. 4  At common
law the rule was applied as a strict rule of property,3 as e.g., the Rule
" For a discussion of the wisdom of submitting a case to the jury on the
strength of a presumption, see McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burdens
of Proof, 5 N. C. L. REV. 291, 302 (1927). For a recent general discussion of
presumptions, see Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 245 (1943).
1 Godolphin v. Abington, 2 Atk. 57, 26 Eng. Reprint 432 (1740); Doctor v.
Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919); Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C.
391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936).
See Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 335, 84 S. E. 347, 348 (1915). In
Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 510, 52 S. E. 201, 203 (1905), the court
stated, ". . . but it was likewise the rule in regard to a deed that, if anything
appeared on its face to indicate that the grantor used the word 'heirs' as designailo
personarum, or if a preceding estate was created so as to make the limitation to
the heirs of the living person a contingent remainder depending for its vesting
upon the event of the death of the ancestor before the life estate terminated, the
word 'heirs' was construed to mean 'children.'"
'Whitley v. Arenson, 219 N. C. 121, 124, 12 S. E. 2d 906, 909 (1941). "'Heir'
and 'ancestor' are correlative terms. There can be no heir without an ancestor.
Hence, there can be no heirs of the living, nemo est haeres viventis. One may be
heir apparent or heir presumptive, yet he is not an heir, during the life of the
ancestor. Consequently, under the strictness of the old law, a limitation to the
heirs of a living person was void for want of a grantee."
'I SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §145 (1936).
'See Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N. Y. 305, 306, 122 N. E. 221 (1919).
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in Shelley's case; but the precise nature of the rule in this country is
uncertain. 6 The common law rule has been recognized in North Caro-
lina and has been applied as a positive rule of property.7
In a recent North Carolina case8 the grantor, after reserving a life
estate, conveyed to her son for life, and at his death to his issue sur-
viving, with the further limitation that if he die without issue, then to
the living heirs of the grantor. The court did not invoke the common
law rule; instead, they applied N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 which reads:
"A limitation by deed, will or other writing to the heirs of a living per-
son, shall be construed to be the children of such person, unless a con-
trary intention appear by the deed or will." The court decided that there
was a contingent remainder in the children of the grantor.
It seems to be well settled that the statute is not applicable where
there is a precedent estate conveyed to the living person.9 The pri-
mary reason for establishing such a restriction to the application of the
statute was to preserve the Rule in Shelley's case.'0 Absent this situa-
tion, however, the statute is generally applicable, regardless of whether
the limitation is to the heirs of the grantor" or to the heirs of a third
person.12 The argument of counsel in the principal case that a life
estate reserved was comparable to a precedent estate conveyed was not
sustained, indicating an emphasis on the precedent estate conveyed.
The statute also is inapplicable if the grantor expresses in the in-
strument an intention that the word "heirs" is used in a sense contrary
to that of "children." However, great difficulty may be encountered in
trying to determine the grantor's true intention. In Therrell v. Clan-
'I SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §147 (1936).
7 Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L.
REv. 59 (1936).
'Ellis v. Barnes, 231 N. C. 543, 57 S. E. 2d 772 (1950).
'Bank v. Snow, 221 N. C. 14, 18 S. E. 2d 711 (1942) ; Whitley v. Arenson,
219 N. C. 121, 12 S. E. 2d 906 (1941) ; Jones v. Ragsdale, 141 N. C. 200, 53 S. E.
842 (1906) ; Marsh v. Griffin, 136 N. C. 333, 48 S. E. 735 (1904).
10 Starnes v. Hill, 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011 (1893) (court held that the
statute did not alter or abolish the Rule in Shelley's case). In Marsh v. Griffin,
136 N. C. 333, 334, 48 S. E. 735 (1904), the court says the statute applies
"... only when there is no precedent estate conveyed to said living person, else
it would not only repeal the Rule in Shelley's case, but would pervert every con-
veyance to 'A and his heirs' into something entirely different from what those
words have always been understood to mean." However, consider the case where
the conveyance is to A for life, then in trust to the heirs of A. Under the rule
set forth by the court the statute is inapplicable; yet the Rule in Shelley's case
is also inapplicable.
11 Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C. 333, 84 S. E. 347 (1915). The grantor, in
contemplation of his second marriage executed a deed to his intended wife con-
veying to her for life, remainder to her issue of such marriage, and on failure of
such issue to revert to the heirs of the grantor; held, N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 is
applicable and the children of the grantor have a contingent remainder.
12 Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 52 S. E. 201 (1905) (conveyance
directly to the heirs of a third person, with no intervening estate being conveyed).
Smith v. Brison, 90 N. C. 284 (1884) (an intervening estate was conveyed, but
the ultimate limitation was to the heirs of a third party).
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tonl 3 the grantor conveyed to A (only child of grantor, and her hus-
band for their joint lives with remainder to A's children of such
marriage; if no such children, then in fee simple to the "right heirs" of
the grantor. Instead of the statute, the court applied the common law
rule, evidently because it thought the grantor, by using the words "right
heirs" in that context, had sufficiently expressed an intention that
"heirs" was not to mean "children."' 4 By so doing the court defeated
the grantor's apparent intent to convey the property to his collateral
heirs. Likewise, it seems that the statute would be inapplicable in the
case of a direct conveyance to the heirs of a living person who has no
children,1 5 for the fact that there are no children should be sufficient to
indicate that the grantor used the word "heirs" in a sense contrary to
that of "children."
The effect of N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 seems to be that the pre-
sumption arising from the use of the word "heirs" is changed. 16 For,
at the common law, where the limitation was simply to the heirs of a
living person, nothing else appearing, the presumption was that "heirs"
meant "heirs general" thereby creating a reversion in the grantor (if to
the heirs of the grantor) or else invalidating the limitation for lack of a
grantee (if to the heirs of a third person). Now, by virtue of the statute,
a limitation to the "heirs" of a living person, nothing else appearing, is
presumed to mean "children." However, both at the common law and
under the statute the presumptions are capable of being rebutted by the
grantor's expressing a contrary intention in the instrument.
Where the statute, however, is inapplicable either (1) because the
living person has no children or (2) because the grantor expresses an
intention to the contrary, it is likely, on the basis of Therrell v. Clanton,
that the court will resort to the common law to reach a solution to the
problem. By so doing it seems that the court is applying a rule without
a reason, the reason for the rule having vanished.' 7 It also appears
that the court is defeating the intention of the grantor, for where the
grantor expressly conveys an estate, his intention may be inferred to
be that the conveyance should be given full effect.18 The common law
"210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L. REv. 59, 61 (1936).
"It is possible that the court overlooked N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6, for it was
not mentioned in the decision. However, it seems more probable that the court
considered the statute but found it inapplicable, for the reason that if the statute
were applied, the conveyance, in effect, would be to A for life, remainder to A's
children, and if no children then to A.
" If the statute were applied where there was a direct conyevance (no inter-
vening estate being conveyed) to the heirs of a living person who had no children,
it seems that the conveyance would be void because it is a class gift, and there
are no members of the class in existence at the time the conveyance is to take
effect.
"See Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N. C. 503, 510, 52 S. E. 201, 203 (1905).
"'I SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §147 (1936).
"1 See 4, FOURTH REPORT MADE To His MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS,
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
rule was considered so objectionable in England that a statute was
passed in 1833 which abolished the rule'9 and permitted the heirs of a
living person to take as purchasers. This method of dealing with the
rule has also been suggested by the American Law Institute.2 °
An addition to N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-6 permitting the heirs of a
living person to take as purchasers where the grantor indicates that
"heirs" does not mean "children" would allow the grantor's intention
to be carried out and avoid the harshness of the common law rule.
THOMAS M. MOORE.
Federal Courts-Venue-Transfer of Actions Under
§1404(a) of New Judicial Code
Section 1404(a) 1 incorporates into the new Judicial Code2 the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens,3 but rather than requiring dismissal,
permits transfer to a more convenient forum even though the venue of
the original forum be proper. 4 The lower federal courts, however, have
not agreed in construing and administering the new subsection, and all
of the resulting conflicting views have not yet been resolved by the
Supreme Court.5
(A). One question causing difficulty is whether a plaintiff, the party
choosing the forum in the first instance, can invoke §1404(a) to trans-
fer his action to a district where a defendant is not amenable to process.
Of the four cases found in which the problem was considered, two
federal district courts have denied plaintiffs the use of §1404(a),O while
APPOINTED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE LAW OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PRoPERTY
74 (1833), reprinted in LEAcH, CASES ON FuTuRm INTERESTs 3 (2d ed. 1940),
Therrell v. Clanton, 210 N. C. 391, 186 S. E. 483 (1936) ; Note, 15 N. C. L. Rxv.
59 (1936).
1" STAT. 3 & 4 Wm. IV, c. 106 §3 (1833).
2' UNIFORM PRoPERTY AcT §15. "When any property is limited, in an other-
wise effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next
of kin of the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior interests in
favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor of
such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by descent."
1 "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought."
Title 28 U. S. C. (Supp. 1949). Effective September 1, 1948.
' For a discussion of this doctrine see Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARv. L. REv. 908 (1947); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Con-
veniens, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1947).
'28 U. S. C. §1404(a), Reviser's Notes at 802-03 (Supp. 1949). This sub-
section should not be confused with §1406(a) which, in a situation where the
original venue is improper, gives the court the alternative of dismissing the action
or transferring it to a proper venue.
One question, whether §1404(a) applies to actions governed by special venue
provisions, appears to have been settled in the affirmative. See Note, 28 N. C. L.
REV. 100 (1949).
' Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N. D. Ill. 1949) (personal
injury, diversity suit) ; Barnhart v. J. B. Rogers Producing Co., 86 F. Supp. 595
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two district courts have made the subsection available to plaintiffs, 7
one of the latter decisions being recently overturned by a court of
appeals."
The courts which permit plaintiff to invoke the subsection construe
the "where it might have been brought" clause to mean where the venme
is proper,9 without regard to service of process requirements.10 Sup-
port is found by these courts in the following reasoning: (1) the words
of the general venue provision, §1391 (a)," provide that diversity actions
may "be brought ...in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all
defendants reside"; (2) the language of the subsection does not dis-
tinguish between plaintiffs and defendants ;12 (3) there has long been
a need for a -device which would permit service of process outside the
district of trial.13 In denying to a plaintiff the use of §1404(a) the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,14 speaking through Judge
Learned Hand, reasoned that to construe §1404(a) as permitting a
plaintiff to bring a defendant to trial in a district outside the state of
the defendant's residence, 15 would be such a revolutionary departure
(N. D. Ohio 1949) (personal injury, diversity suit), commented on in 63 HAiV.
L. REv. 708 (1950), 28 TEXAS L. Ray. 872 (1950).
Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S. D. Iowa 1950) (personal injury, diversity
suit); McCarley v. Foster-Milburn Co., 89 F. Supp. 643 (W. D. N. Y. 1950)
(wrongful death, diversity suit, where California plaintiff, unable to effectuate
service of process on defendants there, sued them in a federal court in New York
where they resided and then moved for transfer under §1404(a) to a district court
in California).8 Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
' In a proper case the clause would also mean of course, where there is juris-
diction over the subject matter. See Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 89 F. Supp. 278, 281 (D. Del. 1950). For cases denying transfer to a dis-
trict in which the action could not have been "brought" in the jurisdictional sense,
cf. Lucas v. New York Cent. R. R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1950) (no
diversity in transferee district, the defendant multiple corporation being a citi-
zen there as well as in the state of the transferring district); United States v.
23 Gross Jars of Enca Cream, 86 F. Supp. 824 (N. D. Ohio 1949) (where the
subject matter of the libel action under the Federal Drug Act could not be found
in the transferee district).
10 The argument that the word "brought" is synonymous with the word "com-
menced" in FED. R. Civ. P. 3, which provides that an action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court, seems to prove too much. It would render the
clause in question meaningless.1128 U. S. C. §1391(a) (Supp. 1949).
12Compare §1404(a) with the language of the removal statute, §1441 (a),
"... any civil action ... may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the
district court of the United States. . .
1' See Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 45 COL. L. Ray. 1, 22 (1945).
"' Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). The reasoning
of the two district courts denying the right to transfer, viav. that the plaintiff
voluntarily selects his own forum and thereby waives his right to a transfer, is
unrealistic, since in these cases the plaintiff has no real freedom of choice.
1' See 28 U. S. C. §1693 (Supp. 1949) "Except as otherwise provided by Act
of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any
civil action in a district court." And see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), which provides
that service may be had throughout a state, and beyond state boundaries, "when
a statute of the United States so provides." These seem to require an express
statutory provision for extending service beyond state boundaries.
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from the existing practice that the court should demand that the Con-
gress make*plain its desire to effect such an innovation. Besides, it would
not be in accord with the doctrine of forum non conveniens underlying
§1404(a), which doctrine always presupposed at least two forums in
which the defendant was amenable to process.' 6 But it seems that the
same reasons would not apply for requiring a sole defendant movant to
be amenable to process in the transferee district, where venue was
proper, since the defendant in moving to transfer could be said to waive
his right to service.' 7
While good policy arguments support the result reached by the
courts allowing plaintiffs to invoke §1404(a), nevertheless it is believed
that wisdom lies with the Second Circuit in waiting for a clearer ex-
pression of intention from the Congress to modify existing procedural
law, particularly since the motivating reason behind the enactment of
§1404(a) was to afford relief to defendants by placing them on an
equal footing with plaintiffs in the selection of a forum.' 8
(B). Another problem involving the interpretation of the "where
it might have been brought" clause of the subsection arises when suit
is brought against multiple defendants, who move for a transfer to a
state in which not all defendants are residents in the venue sense. This
problem inter alia serves to emphasize the importance of reading
§1404(a) in connection with all venue provisions, both special and
general. 19 If the action be one requiring that venue be laid in the dis-
trict wherein the defendants reside, as is provided in many special venue
statutes,20 and in addition said clause has reference to venue, clearly
there can be no transfer, in spite of the inconvenience of the original
forum. Accordingly, one district court has held that in the case of
16See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 506 (1947).
"7 But cf. Hampton Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 90
F. Supp. 645 (D. D. C. 1950) (anti-trust suit, where the court intimated that
fact defendant was not amenable to process in the transferee district was sufficient
to preclude transfer under §1404(a), even though the venue there be proper);
Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 278 (D. Del. 1950)
semble (anti-trust suit). But it appears more doubtful that defendant could like-
wise waive improper venue in the transferee forum since this would impute to
the "brought" clause absolutely no meaning.
- 28 U. S. C. §1404(a), Reviser's Notes at 802-03 (Supp. 1949).
"'Special: 28 U. S. C. §§1394-1403 (Supp. 1949); 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as
amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (Supp. 1949) (FELA); 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§1, 2 (1946) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); 38 STAT. 736
(1914), 15 U. S. C. §22 (1946) (Clayton Act). For a list of other special
venue provisions see United States v. National City Lines, 337 U. S. 78, 85
(1949). General: 28 U. S. C. §1391 (Supp. 1949); particularly note §1391(c):
"A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 28 U. S. C.
§1406(a) (Supp. 1949), see note 4 supra.
20 E.g., 28 U. S. C. §1400 (Supp. 1949) (copyright and patent suits) ; 35 STAT.
66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (Supp. 1949) (FELA) ; 38 STAT. 736(1914), 15 U. S. C. §22 (1946) (anti-trust suits).
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multiple -defendants, there can be no transfer of the action unless it
could have been brought against all defendants, in the venue sense, in
the transferee district.2" Another district court reached a contrary re-
sult, holding that even though one corporate defendant was not a resi-
dent of (not doing business in) the transferee district and could not
have been sued there originally, a transfer would be proper if the de-
fendant consented to the transfer and venue was proper as to the other
defendants in the transferee forum.22
The court denying its authority to transfer construed the "brought"
clause literally and added that since the consent of a defendant who is
sued alone would not avail him the right to transfer to a district where
he was not a resident, then logically, neither should the consent of one
of multiple defendants. The other court, however, construes the statute
so as to be consistent with the only Supreme Court case bearing on the
problem,23 and concludes that it can find no practical reason requiring
transferee forum to be a proper forum for all of several defendants.
Although neither court is too clear as to whether the "brought" clause,
in addition to proper venue, also requires all defendants to be amenable
to process in the transferee jurisdiction, both courts seem to imply that
the process obstacle can be hurdled by use of the consent device if
venue is proper. The discussion of this problem thus far has been lim-
ited primarily to cases governed by special venue statutes. However,
in other actions to which the general venue subsections 1391(a), (b) 24
apply, no added difficulty can be foreseen except in so far as courts
might find the specific language, "all defendants," a deterrent to the
use of the consent device.
The legislative history of the statute indicates that little if any
thought was given to the problem of multiple defendants.25 Until the
matter is clarified 'by specific legislation or resolved by the Supreme
Court, a district court faced with the problem might choose between
(1) denying the transfer entirely and (2) utilizing the consent device.
Where the 'defendant as to whom the transferee forum is improper does
not consent, the court could either refuse the transfer, or perhaps require
"
1Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 278 (D. Del.
1950) (anti-trust suit, 5 of 14 defendants were neither doing business nor could
be found in the state of the transferee district).22 Glasfloss Corp. v. Owens-Corning Corp., 90 F. Supp. 967 (S. D. N. Y. 1950)(anti-trust suit); Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 45 (S. D. N. Y.
1950) (anti-trust suit), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan,
182 F. 2d 329, 332 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1950) (court expressly by-passed a consideration
of the validity of the consent device).
" United States v. National City Lines, 337 U. S. 78 (1949) (Supreme Court
affirmed a transfer of a case factually similar to the Ford Motor Co. case, though
not purporting to make a determination of the validity of the consent device).
-' Title 28 U. S. C. (Supp. 1949).
"See Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 45, 48 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
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the plaintiff to take a severance of his action.26 Unless the consent -de-
vice is employed, the beneficial effect of §1404(a) would appear to be
materially lessened by suits involving multiple defendants.
(C). An important question in the administration of §1404(a) is
whether an order of a district court directing (or refusing to direct) a
transfer under the subsection is reviewable by appeal or by the prerog-
ative writ of mandamus 2 As to the right of appeal, the cases are in
accord that an order transferring or refusing to transfer is interlocutory
and not appealable. 28  On the question of whether mandamus will lie
to review the interlocutory order the authorities are less certain.2 9  As
the cases now stand, if a district court denies a motion to transfer, then
the very nature of this order is such as to call for an extraordinary
remedy and mandamus might lie from the court of appeals if the dis-
trict court erred3 0  On the other hand, if the court grants a transfer,
the court of appeals of the circuit a quo will not entertain a petition
for mandamus but will leave the question for the court of appeals of
the circuit into which the action was transferred,3 unless perhaps the
impropriety of the transfer order is sufficiently glaring. If the transfer
by the district court was clearly unauthorized under §1404(a),32 man-
damus will lie as in the denial situation above
33
The rationale of this difference in results between the denial and
the granting situations seems to be that where transfer is denied, if
defendant movant finally loses on the merits below, any error in the
interlocutory order would probably not be correctible on appeal ;34
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 21; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2911 (2d ed. 1948).
27 MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 110.03 (28)5 (1949);
Note, 58 YALE L. J. 1186 (1949).
" Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950) (order denying trans-
fer) ; Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1950) (order transferring); Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.,
177 F. 2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949) (order transferring); MooRE, COMMENTARY ON
THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 210 (1949) ; Braucher, supra note 3, at 938. But see
Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., supra at 869, 870 n. 1
(appeal treated as petition for mandamus).
"0 See R. R. v. Wiswall, 23 Wall. 507, 508 (U. S. 1874) (order remanding a
removed action could be reviewed by mandamus even though interlocutory);
Larsen v. Nordbye, 181 F. 2d 765 (8th Cir. 1950) (mandamus did not lie to
review order denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss under FED. R. Cir. P. 41 (a) (2));
Notes, 58 YALE L. J. 1186, 1188 (1949), 33 MINN. L. REv. 738, 746 (1949).
"Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F. 2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950) (Judge Swan dis-
senting).
" Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1950) (Judge Frank dissenting).
2 Foster-Milburn v. Knight, 181 F. 2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950) (court did not
have power to order transfer on plaintiff's motion when defendant not amenable
to process in transferee district).
"' While the Supreme Court has not yet passed upon the appropriateness of
this prerogative writ procedure, the question has been before the Court in one
case. Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 (1949) (petition for writ of mandamus and
prohibition).
", The reasoning is that if petitioner loses he could not show that a different
result would have ensued if the case had been transferred.
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whereas if he won below he would be unable to recover his added
expense resulting from the court's refusal to transfer. Hence the need
for an extraordinary remedy. On the other hand, where the court
directs a transfer, the court of appeals of the circuit ad quent would be
in a better position to decide the question of whether mandamus will
lie, since it can best determine whether, in that court,;any other remedy
is available to the plaintiff.3 5
It would appear that the same reasons for granting a petition for
mandamus should apply both where motions to transfer are granted and
where denied. However, to permit the use of mandamus to review every
disposition by a trial court of a motion to transfer, would seemingly
result in unnecessary 'delay.a3 Perhaps the petition for this exceptional
writ should be granted only to correct extreme inequities or a clear
abuse of the trial court's discretion. 7
(D). Another problem in the administration of the new venue statute
arises where state courts have been given jurisdiction concurrent with
federal courts, e.g., suits under Federal- Employers Liability Act.88 To
what extent may a plaintiff in such an action, while defendant's motion
to transfer to a more convenient forum is pending, avoid a transfer by
dismissing his action 9 and bringing it in an equally inconvenient state
court where §1404(a) is not available? The problem really materializes
if the action is one which by statute cannot be removed to a federal
court.4° In the only case found which was 'directly concerned with this
problem41 the court of appeals affirmed an order of the trial court
granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss his action. The court held dis-
missal was not prejudicial error even though it left the plaintiff free to
bring his suit in any state court where he could get service of process
"But see Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d
866, 870 (2d Cir. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
See Note, 58 YALE L. J. 482, 488 (1949).
" MOORE COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 197 (1949).
'o Other examples of statutes conferring concurrent jurisdiction are the Jones
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act. certain portions of the Bankruptcy Act, and
the Securities Act. See MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 398(1949).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (1) (voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff as a matter of
right where notice of dismissal filed before answer or motion for summary judg-
ment). Rule 41(a) (2) (where plaintiff's motion made after answer, etc., no
dismissal save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper).
'028 U. S. C. §1445(a) (Supp. 1949) (FELA suits); 28 U. S. C. §1445(b)
(Supp. 1949) (suits against trustees of common carriers for damaged shipments) ;
see MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 262 (1949) for other
non-removable actions.
"'New York C. & St. L. R. R. v. Vardaman, 181 F. 2d 769 (8th Cir. 1950)(FELA suit, the trial court denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss made after the
court's order transferring the action but within the period of stay) ; cf. White v.




on the defendant, and notwithstanding such subsequent suit in a state
court would not be subject to transfer under §1404(a).
This anomaly, whereby concurrent jurisdiction and non-removability
of certain actions can be used to circumvent 42 the purposes for which
the subsection was enacted, would largely disappear if state courts were
authorized to use the forum non conveniens doctrine to decline juris-
diction of these actions clearly inconvenient in that forum. But even
if federal law is no bar to such a use of the doctrine, it is still not
absolutely clear that a state court has this discretionary power in the
absence of statutory authority.43  Hence legislation by states empower-
ing their courts to use the doctrine would seem necessary to cure the
situation. There is some authority to the effect that the district court
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a) (2) has discretion to deny
plaintiff a voluntary dismissal,43' but the weight of the decisions 'does
not support this construction of the Rule. If this view were adopted,
however, and defendant files his answer before moving for transfer,
plaintiff's subsequent motion to dismiss could be denied where it ap-
peared he was seeking to evade §1404(a) .4 3b However, where the
plaintiff sues initially in an inconvenient state court, and that court is
powerless to utilize the doctrine, he may clearly thwart §1404(a) and
its underlying purposes.
4 4
"See Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 79 F. Supp. 821, 826 (D. Minn.
1948) (where plaintiff threatened to dismiss if defendant's motion to transfer
granted).
"Mooney v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R., 221 P. 2d 628 (Utah 1950) (under
Utah statute the court can decline jurisdiction of FELA suit under doctrine offorum non conveniens) ; Accord, Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117 (1945) ; Douglas
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377 (1929) ; cf. Chambers v. Baltimore
& Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142, 148 (1907) (subject to restrictions of Federal Con-
stitution, state may determine limits of the jurisdiction of its courts). But cf.
State v. Mayfield, 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d 105 (1949) (without such a statute
a Missouri court refused to exercise its judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction of
a FELA suit on the sole ground of forum non conveniens). See Note, 44 ILL. L.
REV. 80 (1949) (if a state legislature has power to determine the jurisdiction
of its own courts, why cannot a state court by its own declaration of rule employforum non conveniens without interference, even in FELA cases?).
' Henjes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 418 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) (plaintiff's
motion to dismiss for purpose of re-entering state court and thereby defeating
court's removal order denied) ; Colonial Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., 3 F. R. D.
29 (E. D. S. C. 1943). Contra: Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 180 F. 2d 379
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 41 (1950) (plaintiff has absolute right to dis-
miss, restricted only by the requirement that it be done "upon such terms and
conditions . .. ").
"b It is arguable that the court could order the plaintiff not to bring the same
suit in a state court as one of the "terms and conditions" of dismissal. But see,
McCann v. Bentley Stores Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234, 235 (W. D. Mo. 1940) (corn-
pensating defendant for costs and expenses are the only "terms and conditions"
conceivable).
" Since the preparation of this note the Supreme Court has decided that a state
court is not prevented by federal law from utilizing the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to dismiss FELA actions, provided such court adopts the doctrine for
all causes of action and does not discriminate against citizens of sister states.
Missouri v. Mayfield, 71 Sup. Ct. 1 (1950), reversing 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d
105 (1949). Most states rejecting the doctrine, the need for state legislation
remains.
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(E). The final question to be considered concerns the effect of state
law under the Erie doctrine on the administration of the subsection.
Suppose the plaintiff sues in a district court where the law of the state
in which it sits requires, on the alleged facts, a judgment for the plaintiff
under the Erie rule; and the defendant moves for a transfer under
§1404(a) to a district court in a state whose law is such that the de-
fendant would win. Assuming transfer is granted, what law should the
transferee forum apply? There are at least three cases40 to the effect
that the law of the transferring district applies, and that a change of
venue affects the place of trial only. Or, in the terse language of the
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, when a removed case4" is trans-
ferred from a New Mexico district court to a California district court
under §1404(a), "there is no logical reason why it should not remain
a New Mexico case, still controlled by the law and policy of that state."
Although this result places upon a transferee district court the addi-
tional burden of deciding each transferred case under a foreign law,
this is an easier task than that which would be forced upon the court
having to decide the question of transfer if the law of the transferee
district were held to control. In this latter situation, if the motion was
to transfer to a district in a state having a public policy opposed to that
of the state of the instant district, the trial judge would have the un-
happy duty of determining the propriety of defeating one state's policy
and applying another.47 Finally, if the law of the transferee district
were to control, this would undoubtedly encourage a defendant to "shop
around" the states of proper venue for the best state law available be-
fore moving for a transfer on the grounds of inconvenience. This, of
course, runs counter to one of the reasons for which the Erie rule was
adopted. Wisdom clearly lies with the existing law.
DON EVANS.
Federal Jurisdiction-Interpleader-Cross-Claims
Plaintiff insurance company (a disinterested stakeholder) brought
an interpleader action to determine the proper recipient of an escrow
fund placed in its possession by one of the 'defendant-claimants. The
suit was instituted in the United States District Court for Southern
"'Headrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 182 F. 2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950);
Magnetic Engineering Co. v. Dings Manufacturing Co., 178 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir.
1950); Greve v. Gibraltar Enterprises, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 410 (D. N. M. 1949).
'" The removal of an action by a defendant to the federal court is no waiver
of his right to move for transfer under §1404(a). White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp.
411 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Stewart v. Atchison T. &. S. F. Ry., 92 F. Supp. 172(E. D. Mo. 1949); Chaffin v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 80 F. Supp. 957 (E. D. N. Y.
1948).
," See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941) (fact situation where disregard
of policy of transferring state would be clearly substantive).
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California under the Federal Interpleader Act of 1936.1 The two
claimants, one a citizen of California (hereinafter called C-i) and the
other, a corporation of Arizona (hereinafter called C-2) had made ad-
verse claims on plaintiff for the full amount of the fund.2  C-2 was
served in Arizona under authority given for nation-wide service in
interpleader actions. 3 He neither answered nor appeared, and the court
awarded the fund to C-1. Meanwhile C-1 had filed a cross-claim against
C-2 for money damages contending that this was permissible under
Rule 13(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since the cross-
claim grew out of the same contract which had given rise to the escrow
fund.4  C-2 appeared specially and objected to the court's jurisdiction
over it regarding the cross-claim. 5 The court dismissed the added con-
troversy and on appeal the dismissal was affirmed.8
The majority of the court, apparently not satisfied with stating the
law applicable to the facts before them, went far beyond the necessities
of the case and said: "It would be a startling conclusion, we think, to
give to Rule 13(g) and the Interpleader statute the effect of enlarging
the jurisdiction of a.court to create rights going beyond those to the
fund which is the subject of the interpleader action."P7
Since C-2 had defaulted on the interpleader action and had not
appeared (other than specially), there is little ground for argument so
far as the actual holding of the case is concerned.8 However, there is
28 U. S. C. §1335 (1948).
' Professor Z. Chafee, Jr., in his article, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of
1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377 (1940) says, "The main purpose of the Federal Inter-
pleader Act of January 20, 1936, was to give the United States courts power to
protect any stakeholder who was threatened with conflicting claims asserted by
citizens of different states."
28 U. S. C. §2361 (1948).
'Rule 13 (g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states "A pleading may
state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action
or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter
of the original action. .. ."
As pointed out in Stitzel-Weller Distillery v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W. D.
Ky. 1941) the civil process of a Federal District Court does not run outside the
district, and service outside the district is void except where specifically author-
ized by a Federal statute. The court also points out that, although the Interpleader
Act will confer jurisdiction over those served outside the district with respect to
their claims against the subject matter of the interpleader, it does not confer
jurisdiction over those defendants for purposes of a personal judgment.
Rule 4(f) provides for service anywhere within the state in which the district
court sits.
'Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950).
'Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502, 503 (9th Cir. 1950).
S "A special appearance, while not regarded as an appearance at all for some
purposes, is one which is made for the sole purpose of objecting to the juris-
diction of the court over the person of defendant." Hale v. Campbell, 40 F. Supp.
584 (N. D. Iowa 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 127 F. 2d 594 (8th Cir. 1942).
"By repeated decisions in this Court it had been adjudged that the presence of
the defendant in a suit in personain . . .is an essential element of the jurisdiction
of a district court .. . and that in the absence of this element the court is power-
less to proceed to an adjudication." Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299
U. S. 374 (1937).
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ground on which to question the breadth of the language quoted above.
Especially is this true if such language has as its only basis a restrictive
attitude regarding the controversial question of permitting adjudication
of other matters than the res at the second stage of interpleader.9
The first ground for criticism is that set forth in the concurring
opinion of the principal case: It is simply that the fact situation which
was before the court did not call for a 'determination of the question of
whether the Interpleader Act and Federal Rule 13(g) could ever be
used in conjunction to secure jurisdiction over a defendant-claimant to a
cross-claim. The opinion suggests that an entirely different problem
might have been before the court had there been any necessity for a
determination of the claimants' rights and obligations under the escrow
instructions which had set up the fund. 10
A second ground upon which to question the broad language of the
majority is found in Bank of Neosho v. Colcord," a prior decision by a
district court. In that case both claimants had formally asserted their
claims in the fund which was the subject of the interpleader action.
One of the defendant-claimants had filed a cross-bill for specific per-
formance of the contract which had given rise to the entire proceeding.
The court refused the other defendant's motion to dismiss the cross-bill
for lack of jurisdiction. The basis for refusal was solely that the subject
matter of the cross-claim arose out of the transaction that was the sub-
ject matter of the original action. This court, taking an opposite view
from the position set forth in the principal case said, "Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 22, 28 U. S. C. A., provides inter alia that all
actions of interpleader 'shall be conducted in accordance with' the Rules
of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Federal District Courts. The
effect of such provision in Rule 22, is to make said Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and particularly Rule 13(g) relating to cross-claims against
co-parties, applicable to interpleader actions.' 1
2
The majority opinion in the principal case distinguishes the Neosho
case on the valid ground that the parties had already appeared to claim
the fund deposited by the stakeholder. But then, apparently in support
of its own attitude, the opinion states, "But the court in that case
[Neosho] gave broader scope to Rule 13(g) than we think proper."1 3
9 A strict interpleader action may be said to have two stages. The first in-
cludes the plaintiff and all defendant-claimants; the second includes only the
defendant-claimants, the plaintiff having dropped out. During this second stage
the court decides which of the claimants is entitled to the res, or thing, which
was the subject of the interpleader.
"
0See Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502, 505 (9th Cir.
1950) (concurring opinion).118 F. R. D. 621 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
12 Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F. R. D. 621, 622, 623 (W. D. Mo. 1949).




The only other &iecisions cited by the majority opinion are one Eng-
lish case, 14 and Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman. 5 The
Neosho case distinguished the Stitzel case by saying that there the court
was not concerned with the effect of Rule 13(g) on interpleader pro-
ceedings.1 6 Whether this is accepted as completely accurate or not, it
can safely be said that the Stitzel case does not stand for the proposition
that a district court could not, under any circumstances, be faced with
a situation in which the combination of the Interpleader statute and
Rule 13(g) would confer jurisdiction over a cross-claim arising in the
second stage of an interpleader action between defendant-claimants of
different states.17
The most recent federal case in which there appears an objection to
the court's jurisdiction over a cross-claim defendant in the second stage
of interpleader is Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery.18 In this case
plaintiff insurance company, a Pennsylvania firm, brought interpleader
to settle claims made upon it for the insured value of an airplane which
had crashed while in possession of a lessee (Coastal Airlines). Both the
owner, who was a citizen of Arkansas, and the lessee claimed the in-
surance, the owner cross-claiming against the lessee for back rent on the
contract of lease which also included the option to buy. At trial the
claimants stipulated the questions to be decided. They were: (1)
Whether the lessee had exercised his option to buy, and (2) whether
lessee owed lessor any rent. After the decision went for the lessor on
both points, the lessee appealed on grounds, among others, that the
District Court of Arkansas had no jurisdiction over the cross-claim.
The court of appeals held, after quoting extensively from the principal
case, and considering the Neosho and Stitzel cases, that the stipulations
and lack of objection waived any objections the lessee might have raised
to venue, or to jurisdiction over the person. This case, as pointed out
in the opinion, is clearly distinguishable from both the principal case
and the Neosho case, but if the decision could be said to lean in either
direction it seems to be toward the Neosho case.' 9
2 Eschger, Ghesquirer and Co. v. Morrison, Kekewich and Co., 6 T. L. R.
145 C. A. 1890).
2S 39 F. Supp. 182 (W. D. Ky. 1941). So far as is determinable, this is the
only other federal case on the point which had been decided prior to the principal
case.2' Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F. R. D. 621, 624 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
' The Stitzel case does, however, stand for what the court cited it (the precise
point) ; and on the same reasoning. There the court stressed the point that since
the cross-claim defendants had not appeared there could be no jurisdiction of the
person conferred by the Interpleader statutes as regards personal judgments on
cross-claims. Rule 13(g) was not specifically mentioned.
18180 F. 2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950).
In language strikingly similar to that found in the Neosho case the court
said. "Both claims arose 'out of the transaction or occurrence' which was 'the
subject matter ... of the original action' within the meaning of Rule 13(g) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 180 F. 2d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1950).
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An extensive argument has been made in favor of permitting the
trial judge to exercise his discretion in deciding whether added con-
troversies should be decided between the defendant-claimants at the
second stage of interpleader.20 One of the most appealing reasons given
in support of this solution is that such a policy would be in the 'spirit'
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a spirit which would ". . . ad-
judicate all phases of litigation involving the same parties .. and avoid
multiplicity of suits .... -21
Whether the solution offered in the aforementioned argument is ever
accepted, the very existence of such an argument by such a highly re-
spected writer should be sufficient to demonstrate that the problem does
not lend itself to solution by any blanket rule. In the absence of
clarity on the point under the Federal Rules, perhaps the best solution
is for the courts to restrict their decisions to the facts before them; and
not attempt in one stroke to eliminate all possibility of claimants ever
combining Rule 13(g) and the Federal Interpleader Act to secure settle-




M a working hypothesis for carrying out the doctrine of "separation
of powers" which is implicit in the Constitution,' the United States
Supreme Court early adopted the "political question" guide.2 That is,
when the issue is one on which final decision rests with the executive
or legislative branches, the Court will not take jurisdiction. The con-
troversy is non-justiciable, for the reason that it is a question for the
"political departments" and not for the judiciary to decide.3 It is
20 Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L.
Rav. 929 (1943).21 H. F. G. Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 7 F. R. D. 654, 656 (N. D. Ill.
1947). Rule 1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states "... . They [the Rules]
shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.' Although Rule 82 forbids any construction of the Federal Rules
which would extend the jurisdiction of the district courts, it is by no means certain
that to permit settlement of cross-claims in interpleader actions between claimants
of different states -would be an extension of jurisdiction.
I In the Federal Constitution it is an implicit rather than express doctrine. The
North Carolina Constitution has an express provision: "The legislative, executive,
and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other." N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §8.
2Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796). See Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. Ray. 485 (1924).
'The fact that a case has been labelled non-justiciable as involving a "political
question" does not necessarily mean that a partisan political struggle is intimately
involved in that case. For example, it is extremely doubtful that party politics
was involved in the case which led the court to say that it is up to Congress to
determine the end of a war. See Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d
[Vol. 29
NOTES AND COMMENTS
apparent that this so-called guide, as stated, does not tell us what ques-
tions are to be decided by the "political departments" rather than by the
Court. This marking off of boundaries has been done by the Court,
itself, by a process of judicial self-limitation, 4 or by orthodox interpreta-
tion of the Constitution,5 according to one's view.
For example, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to recog-
nize as justiciable questions involving foreign affairs,6 or to enforce the
Constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government. 7 Policies
concerning admission and deportation of aliens are not reviewable," nor
are questions on which an executive officer acts within his discretion as
prescribed by law.9
There is another category of cases on which the label "political ques-
tion and non-justiciable" has been stamped by the federal courts, but
not with consistency. These may be called the "political rights" cases;
i.e., involving the right to vote, to have the vote honestly counted, to
form a new political party, or to have equal voting districts.
The right to vote.-At one time it was held that the right of suffrage
was not among the privileges and immunities to which citizens are en-
titled under the Constitution.'" Not until 1883 did the Supreme Court
rule that there is a Constitutional right to vote for members of Congress,
and that Congress has authority to enact laws protecting this right."
290 (D. C. Cir. 1946). Rather, the central idea in such decisions is to make a
proper apportionment of governmental functions, in accordance with the "separation
of powers" doctrine. Of course, the fact that a decision will be made by Con-
gress or the President is a practical guaranty that party politics will be a factor
in some degree.
' See Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1923) and
Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Lizitation, 39 HARV. L. REV. 221(1925).
See Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARv. L. Ray. 296 (1924).
'"These are considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and
certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a court of justice."
Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 260 (U. S. 1796). And it is not for the courts to de-
termine the end of a war declared by Congress. Citizens Protective League v.
Clark, 155 F. 2d 290 (D. C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 787 (1946).
Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden,
7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849). U. S. CoxsT. Art. IV, §4 reads: "The United States
shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government ...
It is for Congress and not the Court to enforce this provision.
8 Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903). However, this doesn't mean
the courts will refuse to intervene where an individual alien is denied certain
constitutional protections. United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832(D. C. Vt. 1899) (unlawful search and seizure; held, evidence inadmissable in
deportation proceeding).
'Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U. S. 103 (1947); Ness v.
Fisher, 223 U. S. 683 (1911); Wilson v. State of N. C., 169 U. S. 586 (1897).
"Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall 162 (U. S. 1874).
"Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883). In this case defendants were
convicted in federal district court in Georgia of beating a Negro because he voted
in an election for a member of Congress. Application for writ of habeas corpus
was denied, holding the federal law under which conviction was obtained as valid.
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Then in Wiley v. Sinkler12 it was established that federal courts have
jurisdiction of actions for damages because of abridgement of this right
of suffrage,13 and subsequent cases have affirmed this view.14
Another possible redress for violation of the individual's right to
vote was the granting of equitable relief by the federal courts. This
form of relief, in connection with the right to vote, was first directly
considered in Giles v. Harris.15 Plaintiff, Negro, sued in equity to
compel the registrars of Montgomery County, Alabama, to enroll him,
as well as other Negroes, upon the voting lists. It seems clear that the
decision denying equitable relief in this case was not based on the
ground that the subject matter was non-justiciable,' 6 but stands for the
principle that the Court should not put itself in the position of attempt-
ing to supervise an election by exercising its equity jurisdiction. 17 The
Giles v. Harris opinion apparently still stands. No Supreme Court
decision has been found in which equitable remedy was permitted to
enforce an individual's right to vote.' 8
Counting the vote.-Not only is there a Constitutional right to cast
a ballot in an election for federal officials; there is also the right to
have one's vote honestly counted.19 And United States v. Classic20 ex-
tended this to apply to primary electi6ns as well as to general elections.
So far, Supreme Court decisions on the protection of the right to an
honest count have been concerned with criminal action against the
12 179 U. S. 58 (1900).
1' The earlier case of Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883) was relied
upon as establishing such jurisdiction.
14 E.g., Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487 (1902) (reversing federal court
below which had dismissed suit solely for want of jurisdiction) ; Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536 (1927) (where defendants acted pursuant to Texas statutes in
denying Negroes right to vote); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932) (where
after the Nixon v. Herndon decision the State Democratic Executive Committee
-was given authority, by statute, to prescribe voting qualifications but the Court
held this was still action under state law and recovery allowed) ; Smith v. All-
right, 321 U. S. 649 (1949) (allowing recovery of damages where plaintiff was
denied right to vote in primary election under authority of resolution by the
Democratic Party Convention rather than under a state law). This last named
case overruled Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935) which had denied re-
covery on the ground that plaintiff Negro was refused permission to vote pursuant
to a resolution of the state convention of the Democratic Party and not under
any state law.
15 189 U. S. 475 (1902).
1 ,. . we are not prepared to say that the decree should be affirmed on the
ground that the subject matter is wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit
court." Id. at 486.
1 See discussion of this point in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 272 (1939).
18 The prominent cases concerning the right to vote did not involve equitable
relief. Smith v. Allright, 321 U. S. 649 (1943) (action for damages for refusing
to permit plaintiff to vote in primary election; recovery allowed). United States
v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1940) (indictment under federal statute charging election
commissioners altered and falsely counted ballots in primary election upheld).
19 United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 (1915).
'313 U. S. 299 (1940).
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wrong-doer rather than individual actions for damages or for relief in
equity.21
Voting districts.-Three cases involving mandamus proceeding which
brought into question the validity of state laws setting up Congressional
districts were decided in 1931.22 In Smiley v. Holm,23 Koenig v.
Flynn,24 and Carroll z. Becker,25 the issue was the same.2 6  The de-
fendants in each case vigorously contended that these were non-
justiciable issues, concerning matters which should be left to the
"political departments" to decide. In each case this defense was re-
jected, jurisdiction was taken, and judgment rendered to the effect that
the respective redistricting acts were invalid and that elections be held
at large2 7 until appropriate state legislation provided for districts. So
far as the justiciability of a case involving the validity of state redis-
tricting acts, it would appear that the three cases above conclusively
settled the matter. 28  But not so. The later case of Colegrove v. Green2 9
muddied the waters of justiciability which, if not crystal clear up to
this point, were at least less murky. Plaintiffs in this case sought a
declaratory judgment to the effect that the Illinois redistricting acts de-
nied them equal protection of the laws. The uncontradicted evidence
"' But see Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W. D. Ark. 1948) (where de-
fendants were charged with illegal possession of poll tax receipts with intent to
obtain a fraudulent count of votes; equitable relief denied).
" Also in an 1892 case, McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, plaintiff sued for
writ of mandamus to order the Secretary of the State of Michigan to disregard
a legislative enactment providing for election of presidential electors by districts,
instead of by the state at large. Defense of "political question and non-justiciable"
was rejected, although decision was for the defendants that the Michigan act was
valid under the Constitution.
23 285 U. S. 355 (1931) (arising from Minnesota).
2 285 U. S. 375 (1931) (arising from New York).
.0 285 U. S. 380 (1931) (arising rrom Missouri).
-' In Minnesota, New York, and Missouri, a congressional redistricting act had
been passed by the legislatures of those states, and in each instance had been
vetoed by the governor and the vetoes had not been overridden by a subsequent vote
in the legislature. In each case, a writ of mandamus was sought, either to re-
strain (in Minnesota) or to compel (in Missouri and New York) giving effect
to the legislative action in an election soon to take place.
"? This was the case in Minnesota and Missouri. In the case of New York,
two new representatives were allotted on the basis of increased population. The
Court of Appeals of New York had ruled that election be based upon old districts
(43), with the two new representatives being elected at large, and this was
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
.' Apparently two federal district courts considered the matter of justiciability
in such cases had been settled. In Wood v. Broom, 1 F. Supp. 134 (S. D. Miss.
1932), plaintiff sought equitable relief on the ground that newly created congres-
sional districts were not composed of compact and contiguous territory or had
nearly as practicable the same number of inhabitants. The district court thought
the 1929 federal act on reapportionment made such requirements of the states,
and gave judgment for the plaintiff. But this was reversed in 287 U. S. 1 (1932)
on the sole ground that the 1929 act did not make such requirements, and the
Court expressly excluded consideration of justiciability of the controversy. See
also Hume v. Mahan, 1 F. Supp. 142 (E. D. Ky.), rev'd, 287 U. S. 575 (1932),
on same grounds.
- 328 U. S. 549 (1946).
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was that no change in congressional election districts had been made for
forty years, despite great changes in the distribution of population result-
ing in districts which ranged in population from 112,000 to 900,000.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the fed-
eral act3° on reapportionment of congressional districts contained no
requirement that districts be compact and have approximate equality
of population. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal
of the action, three members of the majority3 ' for the reason adopted
by the lower court, and for the additional reason that the matter was
"political" and therefore non-justiciable 32
Apparently three justices deciding the Colegrove case33 distinguish
between an action to recover money damages, and an action seeking
equitable relief (before the damage occurs), although the basis of each
suit is a discriminatory state districting law.3 4  In the first, the action
is considered justiciable and the controversy is decided on the merits;
in the second, the action is deemed non-justiciable and the merits of the
controversy are not considered. Although this view was set out in the
controlling opinion of the Colegrove case, it could not be taken as a
holding of the Court inasmuch as a majority of the members thought
that Smiley v. Holm 5 had determined that such cases were justiciable.3 6
Forming a new political party.-That the Court did not accept the
doctrine of non-justiciability expressed in the Colegrove case seems to
be borne out by the later case of MacDougall v. Green.3 7  The plaintiffs
here were members of the Progressive Party in Illinois and sought an
injunction against enforcement of a state law3" requiring signatures of
3°46 STAT. 21 (1929), as amended, 2 U. S. C. §2a.31Justice Frankfurter announced the judgment of the Court and wrote an
opinion as to non-justiciability in which Justices Reed and Burton concurred.
Justice Rutledge (casting the deciding vote) concurred in the result solely on
the ground that the Court should of its discretion decline equitable relief in view
of the short time remaining until the Illinois election, expressing the opinion
that the case was justiciable. Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy were also of
opinion the case was justiciable, and in addition, dissented from the result.
" This Court has refused to intervene in such controversies ". . . because due
regard for the effective working of our government revealed this issue to be of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946).
"Justices Burton, Frankfurter and Reed.
' "This is not an action to recover for damage because of the discriminatory
exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens. The basis for the
suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity." Cole-
grove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946).
35285 U. S. 355 (1931).
"6 The fact that Smiley v. Holm originated in the state court and the Cole-
grove case in the federal court would not seem to be basis for a distinction on
the point of justiciability of controversy. If the court deciding Smiley v. Holm
had thought it non-justiciable, there was precedent to so declare even though the
case came up on appeal from the highest state court rather than originating in a
lower federal court. See Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912),
37335 U. S. 281 (1948).
"ILL. REV. STAT. c. 46, §10-2 (1947).
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200 qualified voters from each of at least fifty counties, contending that
this gave voters of the less populous counties the power to block com-
pletely nomination of candidates whose support was confined to the
populous areas. The defense of "political question and non-justiciable"
was raised, but without discussing jurisdiction the Court expressly de-
cided the case on its merits against the plaintiffs.3 9 Thus by inference,
MacDougall v. Green holds that such political rights cases are justiciable,
and further, that equity jurisdiction may be exercised. 4°
The most recent political rights case in which equitable relief was
sought was South v. Peters,41 in which the Georgia county-unit system
was attacked as being unconstitutionally discriminatory. 42 In a per
curiam opinion dismissing the appeal the language used seems consistent
with the prior cases of Colegrove v. Green and MacDougall v. Green on
the point of justiciability of the controversy,4 3 but applies a harsher re-
striction on the use of equity jurisdiction:
"Federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers
in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical
distribution of electoral strength among its political sub-
divisions." 44
Even so, the opinion may be interpreted as leaving open the possibility
that equity jurisdiction could be exercised for the protection of political
rights other than those involved in the redistricting cases.
45
Although the non-justiciable obstacle posed in Colegrove v. Green
has apparently been definitely rejected by the Court in the later cases,
the view seems to have been adopted in lower federal court decisions. 46
°"It is allowable state policy to require that candidates for state-wide office
should have support not limited to a concentrated locality." MacDougall v.
Green, 335 U. S. 281, 283 (1948).
" See Note, 62 HARv. L. Rnv. 659 (1949) for discussion of equity jurisdiction
of federal courts in political rights cases.
"70 Sup. Ct. 641 (1950).
"Cases contesting the Georgia county-unit system have been before the Court
before, but appeals were dismissed. Cook v. Fortson and Turman v. Duckworth,
329 U. S. 675 (1946). Justice Rutledge pointed out that the courts below, Cook
v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624 (N. D. Ga. 1946) and Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F.
Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga. 1946), based decisions for defendants largely on Colegrove
v. Green, and it was his view that the issues of jurisdiction in such cases had not
been conclusively adjudicated by that decision.
"Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion writes as if the decision of the court
turned on the point of justiciability. See South v. Peters, 70 Sup. Ct. 641, 644(1950). It is unlikely that the majority would so interpret their decision.
"Id., at 642 (italics added).
" For example, the right to register and vote in a primary election. See Rice
v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948). In this
case plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from denying Negro electors right to
vote. Judgment of the district court in favor of plaintiff was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
" See Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295 (W. D. Ark. 1948) ; Turman v. Duck-
worth, 68 F. Supp. 744 (N. D. Ga. 1946); Cook v. Fortson, 68 F. Supp. 624
(N. D. Ga. 1946).
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For this reason, a full discussion of the issue by the Supreme Court,
as it relates to political rights cases, will likely be necessary to avoid
further conflicting opinions in the lower courts.
While it is not clearly known whether the attitude of the Court
toward exercising equity jurisdiction in redistricting cases which arose
in the federal courts would be equally hostile to such cases originating
in the state courts, it is quite probable that both avenues to the Supreme
Court were foreclosed by South v. Peters. Even though equity juris-
diction is denied in the redistricting cases, there remains a possible re-
dress in an action for damages.47 In addition, there is the possible use
of the writ of mandamus in the state courts, as in Smiley v. Holm, by
bringing into question the validity of a state law under the Federal Con-
stitution, and thereupon gaining direct appeal to the United States




The development of the comprehensive automobile insurance policy
has been rapid in recent years and the policy has become one of the
major coverages in North Carolina. It is an extensive sort of policy
including loss of or damage to an automobile from such older causes
as fire and theft as well as losses from more novel causes such as
missiles, falling objects, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water,
flood, vandalism, and civil commotion. Generally, the clause provides
that the coverage extends to any loss or damage except by collision or
upset.'
The coverage of the comprehensive clause, however, is subject to a
number of exclusions and exceptions. In North Carolina, the coverage
does not apply (a) while the car is used as a public or livery convey-
ance, (b) while the car is subject to an undeclared encumbrance, (c)
during war or revolution, (d) if the damage to the automobile is caused
by mechanical breakdown unless such breakdown would otherwise be
covered, (e) to wearing apparel or personal effects, (f) to tires unless
they would otherwise be covered, or (g) to loss due to conversion or
embezzlement or secretion by anyone lawfully entrusted with possession
of the car.2
," This possibility may be inferred from language in Colegrove v. Green, 328
U. S. 549, 552 (1946). See note 34 supra.
1 Often losses falling within what would commonly be covered under an
ordinary collision policy are also included within the comprehensive clause. See
Billings, Present Periphery of Comprehensive Coverage, 306 INs. L. J. 572 (1948).




There have been very few cases in which this coverage has been
construed by the courts, but an interesting case3 was tecided recently
under the North Carolina comprehensive clause of the standard form. 4
The policyholder discovered in June, 1949, that beetles had bored into
the wood portion of her station wagon and had eaten out and damaged
the wooden frame. Insurance policies had been taken out on the 1946
vehicle in 1947, 1948, and 1949, and the last policy was cancelled by
the company in September, 1949. The court, in holding that the plain-
tiff could not recover, rested its decision on the ground that the com-
plaint did not allege that the entry and damage caused by the beetles
occurred between the effective dates of the policy. The court further
stated that the damage was not the result of "direct and accidental loss"
as contemplated in the policy. Apparently relying on the construction
adopted in accidental death cases in this state, the court distinguished
between accidental "means" and "result." 5 Much respectable authority
in other jurisdictions ignores this distinction.6 It is believed that these
cases are founded on sounder policy and that their view is more easily
applied.
Even if the distinction is sound in the accidental death cases, how-
ever, it seems to have been misapplied in the instant case. In Fletcher
v. Security Life and Trust Co.,7 cited by the principal case, the court
held that there could be no recovery for death caused by the injection
of an anesthetic since the policies only covered "death by accidental
means" and not "accidental deaths." In the principal case the policy
'Kirkley v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 232 N. C. 292, 59 S. E. 2d 629
(1949).
' There are standard provisions set out in our automobile insurance specimen
policy to protect the insured. The policy forms are subject to the approval of
the Insurance Commissioner. N. C. GEN. STAT. §58-54 (1943). Mc Teal v. Life
and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 192 N. C. 450, 135 S. E. 300 (1926).
r Courts advocating strict construction argue that "accidental" refers only to
the event or occurrence which produces the result and not to the result itself.
This view is clearly enunciated by the North Carolina court in Fletcher v. Security
Life and Trust Co., 220 N. C. 148, 150, 16 S. E. 2d 687, 688 (1941), where it was
stated: "The insurance is not against an accidental result. To create liability it
must be made to appear that the unforeseen and unexpected result was produced
by accidental means." Other North Carolina cases indorsing this view are: Scott
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 208 N. C. 160, 179 S. E. 434 (1935); Mehaffey v. Provi-
dent Life and Acc. Ins. Co.. 205 N. C. 701, 172 S. E. 331 (1934) ; Harris v. Jeffer-
son Standard Life Ins. Co., 204 N. C. 385, 168 S. E. 208 (1933).
' Justice Cardozo aptly expressed this view in a dissenting opinion in Landress
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 501 (1934): "If there was no
accident in the means, there was none in the result for the two are inseparable.
No cause that reasonably can be styled an accident intervened between them ...
There was accident throughout or there was no accident at all." Other cases sup-
porting the above view are: Bukata v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 145 Kan. 858,
67 P. 2d 607 (1937) ; Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 273 N. Y.
140, 7 N. E. 2d 18 (1937); Griswold v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 107 Vt. 607,
180 A. 649 (1935) ; Ocean Acc. and Guaranty Corp. v. Glover, 165 Va. 283, 182
S. E. 221 (1935).
7220 N. C. 148, 16 S. E. 2d 687 (1941). See also cases cited in note 5, supra.
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provided for "accidental loss" and not for "loss by accidental means."
The North Carolina Supreme Court in the past has classified a num-
ber of events involving automobiles as "accidents." It has held that a
person falling from an automobile forced off the road,8 a tire going flat
causing the car to overturn,9 and lights going out causing a car to go
ovrer an embankment 0 are "accidental." A great variety of other situa-
tions involving Workmen's Compensation Insurance have also been held
to be "accidental" by our court.1
The strict construction which the court placed upon the word "acci-
dental" in the instant case defeats the underlying purposes of compre-
hensive coverage. 12  The words "any 'irect and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile" were seldom found in the standard policies
of other states prior to 1948.13 Usually in other jurisdictions the clause
began with the phrase "any loss or damage to the automobile" rather
than with the more restrictive phrase used in our state.14 The con-
struction adopted by our court in the principal case is not in line with
the spirit of comprehensive coverage.1r
' Higgins v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 220 N. C. 243, 17 S. E. 2d 5
(1941).
'Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935).
" Littrell v. Hardin, 193 N. C. 266, 136 S. E. 726 (1927).
" Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 42 S. E. 2d 96 (1947) (heart
attack from exertion) ; Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 227 N. C. 184, 41
S. E. 2d 592 (1947) (strain from lifting a plate) ; Brown v. Carolina Aluminum
Co., 224 N. C. 766, 32 S. E. 2d 320 (1944) (push by fellow employee); Ashley
v. F-W Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942) (assault); Robbins
v. Bossong Hosiery Mill, Inc., 220 N. C. 246, 17 S. E. 2d 20 (1941) (fall when
reaching for material); Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N. C. 28, 1 S. E. 2d
121 (1939) (lime in eye from pouring); Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214
N. C. 449, 199 S. E. 623 (1938) (illness from eating defective food).
125 APPLEMAN, INsuRANCE LAW AND PRACrICE §3222 (1941).
"The restrictive phrase used in North Carolina is also found in Tennessee.
Lunn v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 584, 201 S. W. 2d 978
(1947). In Alabama the only word used to preface the phrase is "direct." Lock-
wood v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 28 Ala. App. 179, 181 So. 509
(1938).s Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162, 27 S. E. 2d 791 (1943);
Teitelbaum v. St. Louis Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 296 Ill. App. 327, 15 N. E. 2d
1013 (1938); Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.
2d 483 (1947); Wheeler v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 65 A. 2d 10 (Me. 1949);
Roberts v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 203 S. W. 2d 508 (Mo. 1947) ;
Rea v. Motors Ins. Corp., 48 N. M. 9, 144 P. 2d 676 (1944); Tonkin v. Cali-
fornia Ins. Co. of San Francisco, Inc., 294 N. Y. 326, 62 N. E. 2d 215 (1945);
Mathews v. Shelby Mut Plate Glass and Cas. Co., 46 N. E. 2d 473 (Ohio 1939);
Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J. v. Weatherman, 193 S. W. 2d 247 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946). In 1947, the National Automobile Underwriters Association
recommended that the phrase "any direct and accidental loss of or damage to the
automobile" be included within the comprehensive clause itself rather than the less
restrictive phrase "any loss or damage to the automobile." The words of the new
clause had been on the face of the old form before the recommended change.
The purpose of the more restrictive phrase was to exclude intentional and remote
losses as distinguished from accidental and direct ones. There was no intention
to narrow the construction placed on the word "accidental."
"A leading writer on insurance states: "Most companies have now adopted
the policy of writing what is termed 'comprehensive' coverage, which is for the
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It is advocated that North Carolina should place a broader inter-
pretation on the word "accidental" so as to include any unexpected or
unusual occurrence. The court's statements in regard to the "accidental"
nature of the loss in the principal case may be regarded as dicta in future
cases since the outcome of the case rested on other considerations. It
is further believed that a preferable construction of the words "direct
and accidental" to "direct or accidental" would broaden the coverage
of the comprehensive clause so as to include losses covered by the same
clause in other states.
GEORGE J. RABIL.
Labor Law-Employer Refusals to Bargain Collectively
in the Southern Textile Industry
Since 1935, national labor policy has been to encourage the practice
and procedures of collective bargaining. The Taft-Hartley Act,1 though
otherwise curtailing union activities and the bargaining process, osten-
sibly added to2 the Wagner Act3 in respect to this stated policy. Section
8(b) (3) creates a new unfair labor practice for unions refusing to bar-
gain collectively. Section 8(a) (5) continues to make the employer's re-
fusal to bargain collectively with the union selected by his employees, an
unfair labor practice.4
Nevertheless it is still possible for a skillful employer to evade5 the
duty to bargain collectively, at least, temporarily. In Tower Hosiery
Mills, the North Carolina company
".... went through many of the motions of collective bargaining.
It met on numerous occasions with the union, conferred at length
regarding contract proposals, made concessions on minor issues,
and discussed and adjusted several grievances."8
purpose of including all property damage to an automobile, other than mechan-
ical breakdown, exclusive of collision losses. It includes all of the older cover-
ages . .. and in addition many new losses never before contemplated by any
coverage whatever. It is a simple and convenient form of insurance. . . . It is
not a profitable coverage to the average insurer, as the hazards therein included
bring the loss rates above the premium level, but it does possess excellent sales
angles, and is simple of analysis and application." 5 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW
AND PRAcTicE §3222 (1941).
161 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
'§§171 and 174.
3 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq. (1946).
' The N.L.R.B. first determines whether the union in fact represents a majority
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
But outright refusals to bargain are not uncommon in Southern textiles.
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1442 (1948) enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d
504 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Postex Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 118Z948), rev'd on other
grounds, 181 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950); Highland Park Mfg-.-Co., 84 N.L.R.B.
744 (1949).
-81 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1949), enforcenent granted, 180 F. 2d 701 (4th Cir.
1950).
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But despite these "surface indicia of bargaining" during nineteen con-
ferences, held over a period of seven months, it was found that the
company's
". participation in discussions with the union was not intended
to lead to the consummation of an agreement with the union, but
merely to preserve the appearance of bargaining." 7
An examination of the general criteria used in determining "good faith"
bargaining may indicate how successful this evasion of the obligation
to bargain collectively has been in the Southern textile industry.
CHARACTERISTICS OF "GOOD FAITH"
Section 8(d) spells out the obvious requirements of negotiating-
meeting at reasonable times, conferring in good faith, and executing a
written contract on any agreement reached-standards previously set
up.8 In addition, two affirmative actions are proscribed by decisional
law. Unilateral action by an employer on a matter subject to collective
bargaining without prior consultation with the union, is a refusal to
bargain per se.9 Individual bargaining with employees, thus by-passing
and ignoring the union, is also banned.10
'Generally decisive in determining whether an employer refused to
bargain, is the question of "good faith." The phrases used by the
N.L.R.B. and courts in characterizing employer attitude during nego-
tiations, indicate how difficult of legal enforcement are the "good faith"
criteria. Is the employer's "mind hermetically sealed"' 1 against agree-
ment; does he engage in "Fabian tactics"12 or "shadow boxing" ;13 are
the conferences no more than "purposeless talk"'14 or "long and fruitless
negotiations" ?15 Such generalizations have delineated "bad faith." But
if the employer entered negotiations "with an open and fair mind, and
a sincere purpose,"'16 in a "spirit of amity and cooperation,"' 17 exhibited
' Tower Hosiery Mills, 81 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1949), enforcement granted, 180
F. 2d 701 (4th Cir. 1950).
'H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514, 523-526 (1941); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941);
Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939); 13 N.L.R.B. ANN.
REP. 59 (1948).
SN.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 (1949); Aluminum
Ore Co. v. N.L.R.B., 131 F. 2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
10 N.L.R.B. v. Acme Air Appliance Co., 117 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Note,
27 N. C. L. REv. 266 (1949).
" N.L.R.B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. 2d 713, 723 (3rd Cir. 1939).
12 Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 127 F. 2d 180, 185 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 652 (1942).
" Stonewall Cotton Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. 2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 667 (1942).
" Rapid Roller Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 F. 2d 452, 459 (7th Cir.), ecrt. denied,
317 U. S. 650 (1942).
1" N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, 180 F. 2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1950).
16 Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
1' N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941).
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"fair dealings" in his "approach and attitude,"' 8 or made a "patient and
painstaking effort ... to reach agreement,"' 19 there has probably been
no refusal to bargain.
If such short-hand expressions leave a nebulous picture, the task of
dissecting the decisions to isolate individual factors in employer conduct
is even more uncertain. The holding in each case is based on the
employer's total course of conduct.2 0 Direct evidence of a purpose to
violate the statute is rarely obtainable.2 ' Basically, the issues are the
employer's intent, motive, or state of mind.2 The N.L.R.B. early noted
that "the indicia of good faith are notoriously elusive."' ' At best, the
tests for determining "good faith" cope with the extremes of conduct.
24
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTHERN TEXTILES
It is said that collective bargaining is now accepted by employers as
here to stay.25 Unions today are supposedly so strong and powerful
that they dominate the bargaining process, thereby justifying restrictive
legislation.26 To what extent is this true in the Southern textile
industry?
The South today is the frontier of collective bargaining. The
region's major industry, cotton and rayon textiles, is among the least
organized of all manufacturing industries.27 Although collective bar-
gaining has been established at Erwin Mills, Marshall Field, Dan River
and portions of the Cone, Textron, Goodyear, American Enka and
Lowenstein chains, fully 80 per cent of Southern -textile workers are
unorganized,28 including employees of major companies. The AFL and
CIO Southern organizing campaigns, after four years, have substantially
11N.L.R.B. v. George P. Pilling & Son, Inc., 119 F. 2d 32, 37 (3rd Cir.
1941).
12 N.L.R.B. v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 179 F. 2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1950).
2 N.L.R.B. v. Algoma Plywood Co., 121 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir. 1941); 14
NLRB ANN. REP. 75 (1949).
21 Hartsell Mills Co. v. N.L.R.B., 111 F. 2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1940).
22 N.L.R.B. v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F. 2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U. S.
595 (1941); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1947).2, S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 727 (1936).
2 See HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 239-261
(1945) (elaborate techniques used in negotiations).2 2 HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 15 (1945);
TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 220 and 228 (1948).
" MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT To TAFT-HARTLEY 271-281
(1950); Denham, The Taft-Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. REv. 168, 179 (1948);
Torff, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining: A Management Appraisal,
43 ILL. L. REV. 323, 347 (1948).
" Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Recognition, 1946, 64 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 765, 766 (1947).
2 DEP' LABOR BULL. No. 885, UNION AGREEMENTS IN THE COrON TEXTILE
INDUSTRY 1 (1946) ; DeVyver, The Present Statifs of Labor Unions in the South
-1948, 16 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 13 (1949); PROCEEDINGS 5TH BIENNIAL CON-
VENTION TWUA-CIO 73 (1948); Fortune, Nov. 1946, p. 138, col. 1.
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failed to organize Southern textiles.2 Unions are often unable to
secure contracts years after certification8 For sometime now, non-
union mills have either matched or exceeded the economic gains won
through union action. This management initiative was recently drama-
tized by the unilateral announcement by large unorganized Southern
textile employers of an 8 per cent general wage increase.3 'The Winston-Salem, Atlanta and New Orleans N.L.R.B. offices,
servicing the Southern textile area, are the only ones in the nation with
more unfair labor practice than representation cases.32  Compared to a
national average of 27 per cent "no-union" ballots of all votes cast in
representation elections, North Carolina records 57 per cent, Georgia
and Alabama 42 per cent, and South Carolina 41 per cent. 33 The textile
industry as a whole shows an abnormally high proportion of elections
won by "no-union": 42 per cent compared with 29 per cent for all
manufacturing industries.34  Significantly, elections where "no-union"
secures a majority vote, in Southern textiles, are often regarded as
company victories.35 This high "no-union" vote is not solely attributable
2 9
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 5TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION TWUA-CIO 39
(1948) ; DeVyver, The Present Status of Labor Unions in the South-1948, 16
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 18-21 (1949); Textile Bulletin, July, 1950, p. 38, col. 1
(quoting TWUA-CIO as claiming less Southern membership than three years
earlier). Compare with original objectives: Amer. Federationist, June, 1946, p. 6
(one million members in next 12 months) ; Textile Labor, June, 1946, p. 1 (Can-
non, Bibb, Calloway and Avondale Mills as immediate goals); Textile Challenger,
August, 1946, p. 1.
"0 See N.L.R.B. v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 70 Sup. Ct. 826 (1950) ; N.L.R.B.
v. Union Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 511 (5th Cir. 1950); Hillsboro Cotton Mills, 80
N.L.R.B. 1107 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d 504 (5th Cir. 1950);
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d
504 5th Cir. (1950). In all four cases, union was certified in 1944.
"' Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, Sept. 13, 1950, §2, p. 1, col. 4-6. Same
increase set pattern for organized mills. Durham (N. C.) Morning Herald, Oct.
16, 1950, §1, p. 1, col. 1; Winston-Salem (N. C.) Journal, Oct. 6, 1950, §1, p. 2,
col. 3; Raleigh (N. C.) News & Observer, Oct. 18, 1950, §1, p. 2, col. 4. Union
had not demanded wage increase prior to announcement. Textile Labor, Sept. 2,
1950, p. 1, col. 3; TWUA Contract Reporter, Erwin Chain Council, Sept. 12,
1950, p. 4.
11 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1949). Of all N.L.R.B. orders against unfair
labor practices, awaiting enforcement as of August 31, 1949, 32 per cent occurred
within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari,
N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (1949).
" 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 and 179 (1949).
" 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 173 (1949). North Carolina elections, involving
TWUA-CIO or UTW-AFL, held from October 1946 through July, 1950, elim-
inating known decertifications and elections where two or more unions were
involved, show "no-union" secured a majority in 18 out of 30 cases. Unions lost
elections in all units of over 1,500 employees. 3,201 "no-union" ballots of 4,615
valid votes were cast in North Carolina "textile" elections during 1950, through
July. From unpublished tables in preparation for M.A. thesis, by Robert Mil-
lard, Chapel Hill, N. C., based on records at Winston-Salem, N. C., N.L.R.B.
office.
" Cedartown Yarn Mills, 84 N.L.R.B. 1, 8 (1949) (paid holiday and parade);
Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525, 1550 (1948) (street demonstration, bon-
fire, dancing). See DeVyver, The Present Status of Labor Unions in the South-
1948, 16 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 16 (1949) ; Amer. Wool & Cotton Reporter, March
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to employer opposition. Other factors are: a working class with an
individualistic, rural background, still adjusting to industrial life; no
continuous or established trade union tradition; an almost exclusively
white working force, 6 community and press hostility; incorrect union
policies and strategy.3 7 Lost textile strikes in' the region are increas-
ing phenomena. Although company sales of housing facilities are in-
creasing,38 the mill village remains a strongly entrenched characteristic
of the industry, with all the implications of the "dominant landlord-
employer position. '3 9  State anti-union legislation, except for South
Carolina, blankets the South, much of it drastic, although no Southern
state has a labor relations act.
Employer opposition to unionization of Southern mills, by either
AFL, CIO or independent unions, presently includes both major pro-
ducers41 and small companies; Northern-controlled firms42 as well as
Southern independents; employers with existing collective bargaining
relationships in other industries43 and those having established dealings
23, 1950, p. 39, col. 1; Textile Bulletin, June, 1950, p. 32, col. 2; July, 1950, p. 38,
col. 2; Sept., 1950, pp. 40 and 51, col. 2.
" 14 ANN. REP. S. C. DE'T LABOR 67 (1949); LAHN, THE COTrON MILL
WORKER 81 (1944). TWUA-CIO has Jim Crow locals at Danville, Va., and
Leaksville, N. C. KENNEDY, A HISTORY OF THE TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, C.I.O. 294 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina
library, 1950). Compare with Southern industries where the racial employment
ratio is almost 50-50, and union organization widespread: Alabama coal, steel and
iron ore, North Carolina cigarette manufacturing; or industries with largely Negro
employment: cotton oil, tobacco leaf processing and fertilizer.
'7 Some weaknesses seem to be: a centralization of organizational structure
which smothers the development of Southern local leadership; the lack of any
program in regard to work-loads, the major employee grievance; almost no
women officials in an industry in which women comprise some 40 per cent of
the working force.
1" HERRING, PASSING OF THE MUM VILLAGE (1949) passim.
"Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 343 (1949). See 14 ANN. REP. S. C.
DEP'T LABOR 41 (1949) (State mill village population of 184,683).
"O Dodd, Trends in State Legislation Relating to Unions, NYU FIRST ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 497, 499-502 (1948).
"1 See Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949); Burlington Mills Corp., 82
N.L.R.B. 751 (1949); Pacific Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 2 CCH LAB. LAW RE'.
10, 263 (1950); The American Thread Co., Inc.' 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949); Hart
Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1566(1950) (Ely & Walker); Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949);
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
Although the textile industry remains competitive, a distinct trend toward cor-
porate integration and monopoly is taking place. Markham, Intebration in the
Textile Industry, 28 HARv. Bus. REv. 74 (1950); Barkin, The Regional Sig-
nificance of the Integration Movement in the Southern Textile Industry, 15
SOUTHERN EcoN. J. 395 (1949).
" See N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 (1949); Pacific
Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3. 2 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 10, 263 (1950); Chicopee
Mfg. Corp. of Ga., 85 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1949); Premier Worsted Mills, 85 N.L.R.B.
985 (1949); The American Thread Co., Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).
"U. S. Rubber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 3 (1949); Aldora Mills, 79 N.L.R.B. 1, 9(1948).
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with textile unions in other mills. 44  The uniformity of the pattern of
employer opposition to unionization of Southern textile mills may be
attributable to the fact that most of the employer cases before N.L.R.B.
and courts are handled by only five law firms. 45  Employer techniques
have occasionally included: use of violence, 46 appeals to race prejudice, 47
and injunctions during strikes.48
THE ROLE OF FIRST CONTRACTS
Such regional manifestations must be viewed as the background for
the problem of employer refusals to bargain in initial joint dealings. 49
The critical nature of first negotiations is well recognized. Collective
bargaining then has more to do with organizational questions than sub-
stantive matter. The union, insecure and recently established, is a
doubly sensitive "bride" in the "shot-gun wedding" with management.
The employer is faced with making a fundamental -change in thinking
and procedure. From individual bargaining-which usually means em-
ployees played no role, while the employer unilaterally fixes conditions 0
" Pacific Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 2 CCH LAB. LAW REP. 110, 263 (1950);
Chicopee Mfg. Corp. of Ga., 85 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1949) ; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher
Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949); The American Thread Co., Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 593(1949).
' Located in Greensboro and Charlotte, North Carolina; Atlanta and Decatur,
Georgia; and Fort Worth, Texas.
' Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1146-1153 (1949) (employer
procured pistol permits, armed some 75 or 100 persons for attack upon picket
line with resultant beatings and violence); Dixie Mercerizing Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
285, 294-297 (1949) (with plant whistle as signal, mob of 50 or 60 persons pre-
vented distribution of union handbills, seized same and forced organizers to leave;
employer held responsible); Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949)
passim (murder threats, planned provocation and physical assaults by employer
agents) ; Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525, 1548-1549 (1948) (employer
responsible for attempt to run union men down by driving car up on sidewalk,
physical assault and attempted provocation).
,7 Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 339-341 and 355-362 (1949); Russell Mfg.
Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1107 and 1110 (1949); Macon Textiles, Inc., 80
N.L.R.B. 1525, 1547 (1948); Magnolia Cotton Mill Co., Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 91,
113 (1948). See Textile Bulletin, June, 1950, p. 31, col. 2; Sept., 1950, p. 42,
col. 2; Fortune, Nov., 1946. p. 230, col. 2.
," See Hart Cotton Mill, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N. C. 431, 57 S. E. 2d 803
(1950) ; Aired v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S. E. 2d 240 (1949), cer. de-
nied, 338 U. S. 937 (1950); Safie Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C. 375, 45 S. E.
2d 577 (1947); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333, 39 S. E. 2d 861(1946); ExEcuTrIVE COUNCIL REPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION, TWUA-CIO
30 (1950).
"114 NLRB ANN. REP. 159 (1949) (26 per cent of all unfair labor practice
cases against employers involve refusals to bargain). During this period, fiscal
1949, 23 per cent of all cases filed involving 8(a) (5) allegations, arose in the
13 Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas con-
tributed 14 per cent of the national total). Twenty per cent of all 8(a) (5)
charges filed during fiscal 1948-1950 were Southern cases. From statistical chart
prepared for writer by N.L.R.B., October 20, 1950. See MILLIS AND BROWN,
FRom THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 121, 127, 293 and 448 (1950); Textile
Labor, July 22, 1950, p. 11, col. 4.
" See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898); N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 33 (1937).
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-the step is to collective bargaining,51 with its majority rule principle 52
and the sharing of certain managerial functions with union represent-
atives.53
The crux of the statutory protection of employee rights is in Section
8(a) (5), whereby they are enabled through collective bargaining to
secure the fruits of self-organization such as grievance procedure and
seniority rights.s4 Recognition and negotiation are not ends in them-
selves but the means of securing these written, industrial constitutions.55
Collective bargaining is now so generally accepted elsewhere, that the
present 'debate centers on the scope of its subject matter ;56 in the South,
however, attention must still be focused on the initial step in the estab-
lishment of the collective bargaining process.
CONCLUSIONS
If national labor policy is to work out a peaceful solution5 7 in the
South, the N.L.R.B. and courts might consider four possible improve-
ments in the approach toward employer refusals to bargain.
(1) To give body to the vague criteria of "good faith" bargaining,
conduct should be examined not only in the light of the employer's total
course of action, 58 but in the specific context of the particular industry
"' Collective bargaining contracts add "dignity to the position of labor and
remove the feeling on the part of the worker that he is a mere pawn in industry
subject to the arbitrary power of the employer. [The contract becomes] the in-
dustrial constitution of the enterprise, setting forth the broad general principles
upon which the relationship of employer and employee is to be conducted." Parker,
J., in N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. 2d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 1940).
'
2 Weyand, The Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COL. L. REV. 556
(1945).
"TAYLOR,, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 61 (1948);
Chamberlain, The Nature of the Bargaining Process, 11 U. OF Prrr. L. REV. 397,
406 (1950). See Barkin, The Technical Engineering Service of an American
Trade-Union, 61 INT'L. LAB. REv. 609 (1950).
"' MLLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 111, 121
and 448 (1950); Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389, 394 (1950.
"' See H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514, 525 (1941) ; Timkin Roller
Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F. 2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1947).
" Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950) passim; Cox and Dunlop, The
Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63
HARv. L. REV. 1097 (1950) passln.
"' The establishment of collective bargaining in steel, auto and rubber was not
peaceful. BRooxs, As STEEL GOES . . . , 130-152 (1940); LmNSON, LABOR ON
THE MARCH c. 7 and 201-209 (1938); ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEWIs c. 5, 6 and 7
(1949) ; MCKENNEY, INDUSTRIAL VALLEY 275 et seq. (1939). For developments
in textiles, see DEP'T LABOR BULL. No. 963, WORK STOPPAGES CAUSED BY LABOR-
MANAGEMENT DISPUTES IN 1948 17 (union organizational issues involved in 54
per cent of the man-days idle in the textile industry, compared with 17 per cent
for all manufacturing industries); ExECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 5TH BIENNIAL
CONVENTION TWUA-CIO 48 (1948); PROCEEDINGS 5TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION
TWUA-CIO 153 (1948) ; EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ROPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION
TWUA-CIO 37 (1950).
" See footnote 20, supra.
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and particular area.59 Prevailing collective bargaining practices therein
might provide a helpful measuring rod.60
(2) In appraising the conduct of negotiations, the role of compro-
mise, so essential to the establishment of collective bargaining,61 should
be given greater emphasis. The legislative history of Section 8(d)
seems to indicate that it is no barrier to a continuing requirement of
counter-proposals in negotiations. 2  In N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery
Mills, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in finding a refusal
to bargain, compared concessions by the union and its willingness to
compromise with the uncompromising attitude of the employer. 3 While
the give-and-take of negotiations admit of no rigid yardstick, more con-
sideration might be given to comparing and evaluating the bargaining
attitudes of the two parties.
(3) The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit might well emulate
other circuits in cooperating with the N.L.R.B., to implement national
labor policy in the South. The labor philosophy expressed in the court's
dicta6 4 shows an underestimation of the values of collective bargaining.
The N.L.R.B. recently had occasion0 5 to ask the Supreme Court to
admonish the Fifth Circuit60 for its refusal to enforce certain N.L.R.B.
orders without giving any reason. Southern opposition to collective
" 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 86 (1936), quoting from M. H. Birge & Sons, Inc.,
1 N.L.R.B. 731, on the relevant factors in determining a refusal to bargain:
"... the labor relations background of the industry and the actions of the other
union manufacturers. . . ." See Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1098-
1101 and 1127 (1949) (use is made of the local sociological setting against which
employer conduct occurred); N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U. S. 226, 230
(1949) ("We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill town
with the vast metropolitan centers. .. ").
"
0 See N.L.R.B. v. Knoxville Pub. Co., 124 F. 2d 875, 880 (6th Cir. 1942)
(prevailing economic conditions); N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, 180 F. 2d
701, 704 (4th Cir. 1950) (employer's stringent proposal "was apparently previously
unheard of in this area"). See MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARLEY 117 (1950); Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining
by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 405 (1950).
"1 See Torff, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining: A Managenent
Appraisal, 43 ILL. L. REv. 323, 326 (1948).
6 2 See VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Acr, 1947 47; MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 448
(1950). Contra: Adler Metal Products Corp., 79 N. L. R. B. 219 (1948) ; Den-
ham, The Taft-Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. REv. 168, 179 (1948). But cf. Vanette
Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116, 1128 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d 504
(1950).
63 180 F. 2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1950).
, N.L.R.B. v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 180 F. 2d 585, 586 (5th Cir.
1950) ; N.L.R.B. v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 167 F. 2d 212 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Stonewall
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. 2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S.
667 (1942) (opinion before re-hearing) ; N.L.R.B. v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 119 F.
2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94
(5th Cir. 1939).
61 N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari, pp. 11-23, N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta
Metallic Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949).
" See N.L.R.B. v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 70 Sup. Ct. 826 (1950) ; N.L.R.B.
v. Pool Mfg. Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 830 (1950) (note dissenting opinion).
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bargaining may have been encouraged by the willingness of the Fifth
Circuit to set aside N.L.R.B. orders.0 7 Although that court has secured
compliance by using its contempt power to mediate, 8 it is possible that
a sympathetic approach toward the statutory obectives and a stiffening
of the contempt penalties might have a more constructive effect upon
the willingness of Southern textile employers to bargain collectively.
(4) The discretionary injunction power of the General Counsel 9
might be used to secure the compliance with national policy of especially
recalcitrant employers in the region. The speed of injunction could
help offset the deadly effects of long 'delays, often destructive of col-
lective bargaining, regardless of the final legal outcome.70
M. H. Ross.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence-
Sufficiency Against Demurrer
There has been much confusion in the North Carolina courts con-
cerning the necessary requirements of complaints1 to withstand demurrer
for failure to state a cause of action2 in actions for negligence. In the
recent case of Davis v. Rhodes,3 an action for wrongful death, complaint
alleged "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly, and negligently struck
and collided" with the motor scooter on which the intestate was riding.
Defendant answered, denying negligence. Thereafter, plaintiff was
allowed to amend his complaint. This amendment, filed more than one
year after the death of the intestate, particularized the acts of negligence
relied upon. Defendant then demurred to the original complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and moved to dismiss the action as the
amendment was filed more than one year after the death of the intes-
tate.4 The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action;
7 N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari, p. 13, N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Metallic
Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949).
" N.L.R.B. v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F. 2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949), 178 F.
2d 347 (5th Cir. 1949), 179 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1950). Court allowed employer
to escape contempt penalty but kept case on docket and read transcripts of nego-
tiations, noting results of its mediation in later opinions.
81 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §160j (Supp. 1947).
70 MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 119 (1950);
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION TWUA-CIQ 33 (1950)
(court rulings are often "hollow victories"). Se2 footnote 30, supra, for length
of delays.
' A complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts consti-
tuting a cause of action. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-122 (1943).
'Defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face thereof
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
3 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
4 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) (... action . . . to be brought within one
year after such death). Where the original complaint does not state a cause of
action, an amendment, if it be good and available, would relegate the plaintiff to
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plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Barnhill writing the opinion for a
unanimous court, held that the original complaint constituted a defective
statement of a good cause of action, and that the defendant's remedy,
after answer, was not by demurrer, but by motion to make more definite.
The principle that a complaint which states a good cause of action in
a defective manner is not subject to demurrer is well established in the
North Carolina courts, but its application to the complaint in the instant
case is not consistent with its application in the past, and is inconsistent
with other established rules of pleading in our courts.
For purposes of demurrer, the complaint alleged only that the de-
fendant collided with the rear of the vehicle on which the intestate was
riding, the averments of negligence, recklessness, and unlawfulness be-
ing conclusions of fact or law and not admitted by demurrer.5 Applying
to these allegations the oft quoted maxim that "the allegations in a
complaint do not constitute a cause of action for the want of some
essential averment," 6 it can be seen that no facts are stated which give
rise to a cause of action. An essential element of an action for negli-
gence is the breach of some duty.7 The above allegations possibly imply
a duty to use due care, but they neither state nor imply facts indicating
a breach of this duty. Negligence is not presumed from the mere fact
that the intestate was killed, or that there was a collision. 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently refused to sustain a complaint
against demurrer which did not contain facts showing a duty and breach
thereof.9
the position of having thereby for the first time stated a cause of action against
the demurring defendants, and the fact that the action now sought to be main-
tained on the amended complaint originated more than one year after the death
of the intestate can be taken advantage of by demurrer. George v. Atlanta and
Charlotte Airline Ry., 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936); Webb v. Eggleston,
228 N. C. 574..46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948).
1 The office of demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, admitting
for the purpose the truth of the allegations of fact contained therein, and ordinarily
relevant inferences of fact necessarily deducible therefrom are also admitted, but
the principle does not extend to admissions of conclusions or inferencs of law.
Ferrell v. Worthington, 226 N. C. 609, 39 S. E. 2d 812 (1946); Newton v.
Chason, 225 N. C. 204, 34 S. E. 2d 70 (1945) ; Smith v. Smith, 225 N. C. 189, 34
S. E. 2d 148 (1945).
' Conley v. Richmond & D. R. R., 109 N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891). That
the pleader must allege all the material ultimate facts upon which his cause of
action is based has become axiomatic. If all such facts are not alleged a de-
murrer will be sustained. Ledwell v. Proctor, 221 N. C. 161, 19 S. E. 2d 234
(1942).
'Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329 (1932) ; Taylor v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 145 N. C. 400, 59 S. E. 129 (1907) ; Thomason v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E. 205 (1906).
1 Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329 (1932) ; Swainey v. Great
A. & P. Co., 202 N. C. 272. 162 S. E. 557 (1932) ; Burke v. Carolina Coach Co.,
198 N. C. 8, 15D S. E. 636 (1929).
'Harris v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 220 N. C. 698, 18 S. E. 2d 204
(1941); Daniels v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 217 N. C. 768, 9 S. E. 2d 388
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The practice of sustaining complaints against demurrer when they
contain a defective statement of a good cause of action has been limited
to those complaints which contain, expressly or by implication, some
recital of specific acts which give rise to the cause of action. This
is true of the cases cited in support of the Davis decision.10 This prac-
tice has been applied to actions involving negligence," false imprison-
ment, 2 contract, and many others.
14
The practical effect of the Davis decision is to modify greatly the
former requirement as to what factual allegations constitute a cause
of action for negligence. The omission of the acts giving rise to the
action is not fatal, but is at worst a defective statement of a good cause
of action, which allows any required amendments to relate back to the
original complaint1 5 The net result is to give the pleader in actions
for negligence the privilege of "notice pleading" as allowed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.' 6 This is of great importance to the
(1940); George v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E.
324 (1934); Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928); Taylor
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 145 N. C. 400, 59 S. E. 129 (1907); Thomason v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E. 205 (1906); Conley v. Richmond
& D. R. R., 109 N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891).
10 Presnell v. Beshears, 227 N. C. 279, 41 S. E. 2d 835 (1947) (negligence set
out in detail and sufficient allegation of agency) ; Livingston v. Essex Investment
Co., 219 N. C. 416, 14 S. E. 2d 489 (1941) (allegation that brick were improperly
encased in mortar); Foy v. Stephens, 168 N. C. 438, 84 S. E. 758 (1915) (allega-
tions were sufficient to give rise to action for fraud, but there was no direct
allegation of fraud; held sufficient against demurrer); Dockery v. Hamlet, 162
N. C. 118, 78 S. E. 13 (1913) (sufficient allegation of indebtedness); Eddleman
v. Lentz, 158 N. C. 65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911) (allegation that judgment had been
assigned "for value and without recourse" held sufficient allegation of payment) ;
Gillikin & Gaskell v. Lake Drummond Canal Co., 147 N. C. 39, 60 S. E. 654
(1908) (allegation that barge obstructed canal) ; Blackmore v. Winters, 144 N. C.
212, 56 S. E. 874 (1907) (allegation of amount of rent, demand, and failure to
pay held sufficient allegation of indebtedness) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Main,
132 N. C. 445, 43 S. E. 930 (1903) (indirect allegation of necessary facts) ; Allen
v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 120 N. C. 548, 27 S. E. 76 (1897) (allegation of defective
brake).
' See note 9 supra; Cunningham v. Hayes, 214 N. C. 456, 199 S. E. 627
(1938); Piner v. Richter, 202 N. C. 573, 163 S. E. 561 (1932) ; Lee v. Caveness
Produce Co., 197 N. C. 714, 150 St E. 363 (1929) ; Gillikin & Gaskell v. Lake
Drummond Canal Co., 147 N. C. 39, 60 S. E. 654 (1908); Allen v. Carolina Cent.
Ry., 120 N. C. 548, 27 S. E. 76 (1897); Conley v. Richmond & D. R. R., 109
N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891).
12 Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C. 467, 70 S. E. 947 (1911).
" Hawkins v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 221 N. C. 75, 18 S. E. 2d 823
(1942) ; Sohmer v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 214 N. C. 522, 199 S. E. 711 (1938).
" Jones v. Jones Lewis Furniture Co., 222 N. C. 439, 23 S. E. 2d 309 (1942)
(breach of warranty); Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N. C. 65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911)(action by sureties to set aside conveyances of insolvent defendant); Ladd v.
Ladd, 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897) (divorce action).
1 Bailey v. Roberts, 208 N. C. 532, 181 S. E. 329 (1935); Renn v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915) ; Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N. C.
65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911) ; Ladd v. Ladd. 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897).
16 . . a very brief statement, designed merely to give notice of the claim to
the opponent." CLARK, CODE PLEADING §11 (2d ed. 1947); McINToSH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §346 (1929); FED. R. CIw. P., form 9
1950]
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pleader for two reasons: (1) If, through oversight or lack of sufficient
facts at the time of drafting, the complaint contains only a simple
allegation that "X negligently drove his automobile and as a result
struck Y," this allegation will satisfy any statute of limitations or con-
dition precedent to the action, so that a demurrer interposed after the
expiration of the time limit will not cause the action to be dismissed,
17
and plaintiff may or may not be ordered to amend the complaint; (2) if
specific acts of negligence are alleged, the proof is likely to be confined
to those acts alone,18 but if a general allegation is made, and the oppos-
ing counsel does not object, there will be no confining bounds for the
proof that is later presented, and the complaint can subsequently be
amended to include any acts of negligence which were proved at the
trial."'9 If an objection is made, it will not be fatal, but will only
necessitate an amendment.
There was no indication in the Davis decision as to how far the
Court was prepared to extend this privilege of "notice pleading," but
in view of the unequivocal position taken by the Court in -dealing with
other types of action,2 it appears that the pleader in the future should
not rely on this precedent except in actions involving negligence.
Whether the decision will apply to actions other than those for negli-
gent wrongful death will be determined only by subsequent cases.
RIcHARD D-Y. MANNING.
(... defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff . . . ) ; Wat-
son v. World of Mirth Shows, 4 F. R. D. 31 (S. D. Ga. 1944) (... to state a
cause of action for negligence it is only necessary to allege that defendant acted
negligently and as a result plaintiff was injured).
17 Renn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915) ; Lefler
v. Lane, 170 N. C. 181, 86 S. E. 1022 (1915); Dockery v. Hamlet, 162 N. C.
118, 78 S. E. 13 (1913) ; Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E.
642 (1904) : Ladd v. Ladd, 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897).8 McCoy v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 142 N. C. 383, 387, 55 S. E. 270, 272 (1906).
cc.. proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation without proof." In-
gold v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 230 N. C. 142, 52 S. E. 2d 366 (1949) ; Stafford v.
Yale, 228 N. C. 220, 44 S. E. 2d 872 (1947).
29 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-168 (1943); Deligny v. Tate Furniture Co., 170 N. C.
189, 86 S. E. 980 (1915).
20 See notes 6 and 9 supra. In one subsequent decision, Steel v. Locke Cotton
Mills, 231 N. C. 636, 58 S. E. 2d 620 (1950), an action for mandamus by a stock-
holder for payment of preferred dividends, complaint alleged surplus and net
profits available for dividends on January 1, 1949, but did not allege such surplus
and profits at date of commencement of action. Demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action was sutained, the court holding that "a fact essential to a cause
of action is not alleged when it is only to be inferred as a conclusion from other
facts specifically averred, which are not inconsistent with the opposite conclusion."
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